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 Traditional security algorithms for authentication and encryption rely heavily on 
the digital storage of secret information (e.g. cryptographic key), which is vulnerable to 
copying and destruction. An attractive alternative to digital storage is the storage of this 
secret information in the intrinsic, unpredictable, and non-reproducible features of a 
physical object. Such devices are termed physical unclonable functions (PUFs), and recent 
research proves that PUFs can resolve the vulnerabilities associated with digital key storage 
while otherwise maintaining the same level of security as traditional methods. Modern 
cryptographic algorithms rest on the shoulders of this one-way principle in certain 
mathematical algorithms (e.g. RSA or Rabin functions). However, a key difference 
between PUFs and traditional one-way algorithms is that conventional algorithms can be 
duplicated.  
Here, we investigate a silicon photonic PUF a novel cryptographic device based on 
ultrafast and nonlinear optical interactions within an integrated silicon photonic cavity. This 
work reviews the important properties of this device including high complexity of light 
interaction with the material, unpredictability of the response and ultrafast generation of private 
information. We further explore the resistance of silicon photonic PUFs against numerical 
modeling attacks and demonstrate the influence of cavity’s inherent nonlinear optical 
properties on the success of such attacks. Finally, we demonstrate encrypted data storage and 
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compare the results of decryption using a genuine silicon PUF device the “clone” generated 
by the numerical algorithm. 
Finally, we provide similar analysis of modeling attacks on another well-known type 
of optical PUF, called the optical scattering PUF (OSPUF). While not as compatible with 
integration as the silicon photonic PUF, the OSPUF system is known to be extremely strong 
and resistant to adversarial attacks. By attacking a simulated model of OSPUF, we attempt to 
present the underlying reasons behind the strong security of this given device and how this 
security scales with the OSPUFs physical parameters. 
 
Primary Advisor: N. Peter Armitage 
Secondary Advisor: Mark A. Foster 
  














 The first couple of years in the United States were quite challenging for me. I had 
to adapt to a new country, make new friends, speak and think in a new language. But I was 
quite lucky to meet people that made my transition comfortable and smooth. First of all, I 
would like to thank my academic advisors: Peter Armitage and Mark Foster. I am deeply 
grateful for Prof. Foster’s encouragement at the times when I really needed it. I appreciate 
his both material and moral support, brilliant expertise and great ideas that significantly 
helped me throughout my program. I am also thankful to Prof. Armitage since he is the one 
who introduced me to Prof. Foster back in 2013. His support and advice will always remain 
invaluable to me. I would also like to thank Prof. Amy Foster for being my instructor at 
one of her classes and for the smooth transition to the research of the lab.  
 I appreciate Ms. Kelley Key and Prof. Oleg Tchernyshyov who supported me in 
the early beginning of my Ph.D. program. Kelley helped me to navigate the educational 
issues and program related procedures, for which I am grateful for. 
 I am thankful to my parents Alisher Atakhodjaev and Iroda Vafokulova for their 
support, patience for my regular visits, personal sacrifices, and encouragement. I would 
not have achieved anything without their countless lessons and life experience. I am 
thankful to my lovely sister Dildora Atakhodjaeva for her sense of humor and limitless 
support during my life in Baltimore. I thank my aunt Abdalimova Guzal, my cousins, 
v  
relatives and closest friends in Moscow who have always supported me over the years and 
always waited for my visits. 
 I deeply thank my colleagues in the lab, Dr. Bryan Bosworth, Milad 
Alemohammad, Jasper Stroud, Jeff Shin, Hongcheng Sun, Kangmei Li for all the 
assistance they provided me, for countless questions I asked them and for teaching me the 
necessary skills in order to survive in the program. My deep respect goes to Bryan 
Bosworth who was patient enough to listen to my arguments, to explain the same things 
many times, and for spending with me zillion hours in the lab assisting me to align my 
experimental setup. I am grateful for Milad’s great ideas he always suggested, his sincere 
willingness to help, and his kindness to listen to my concerns. 
 My life would have been more boring without my friends I met in Baltimore. My 
special thanks go to Prasenjit Bose. He was the first friend at JHU who bought me a 
sandwich when I even didn’t know where to buy it. He helped me out countless times and 
we had great fun times together. I thank Mikhail Osanov, Subranshu Mishra, Ankur Gupta, 
Daniil Pakhomov, Polina Koroleva, Chris Sapsanis, Nikita Ivkin, Robert Dipietro, 
Nurgissa Umatay for great times we shared at JHU. I thank Diyora Khasanova who makes 
my life brighter by occasional visits to Baltimore. Her support and love always helped me 
to stay afloat in the busiest period of times at work.  
 On a final note, I would like to say that I will owe everyone mentioned here for the 
rest of my life, as their actions have played a critical role in the shaping of my personal life 






Table of Contents 
Abstract ............................................................................................................................... ii 
Acknowledgement ............................................................................................................. iv 
Table of Contents ............................................................................................................... vi 
List of Figures .................................................................................................................... ix 
List of Tables ................................................................................................................... xiii 
Chapter 1 : Introduction and Overview .............................................................................. 1 
1.1 Internet of Things and Digital Era ............................................................................ 2 
1.2 Information Security in a Modern World ................................................................. 5 
1.2.1 Symmetric Key Algorithms ................................................................................ 6 
1.2.2 Asymmetric Key Algorithms .............................................................................. 7 
1.3 Current Challenges in Information Security ............................................................. 8 
1.4 Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) .................................................................. 10 
1.4.1 Concept ............................................................................................................. 10 
1.4.2 PUF Terminology ............................................................................................. 13 
1.4.3 Main Properties of PUFs .................................................................................. 15 
1.4.4 PUF: metrics and evaluations ........................................................................... 18 
1.4.5 Types of PUFs .................................................................................................. 21 
1.4.6 PUF Implementations ....................................................................................... 22 
1.4.6.1 Electronic PUFs ............................................................................................. 22 
1.4.6.2 Optical PUFs.................................................................................................. 25 
1.5 Applications of PUFs .............................................................................................. 29 
1.6 Dissertation Outline ................................................................................................ 30 
vii  
Chapter 2 : Attacks on PUF systems ................................................................................ 34 
2.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................. 34 
2.2 Attacks on Weak PUFs ........................................................................................... 35 
2.3 Attacks on Strong PUFs .......................................................................................... 36 
2.4 Security vs Practicality ........................................................................................... 41 
 
Chapter 3 : Silicon Photonic Physical Unclonable Function ............................................ 44 
3.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................. 44 
3.2 Nonlinear Properties ............................................................................................... 46 
3.2.1 Nonlinear optics ................................................................................................ 46 
3.2.1 Nonlinear processes in the silicon cavity ......................................................... 51 
3.3 Challenge – Response Authentication .................................................................... 53 
3.4 Experimental Results .............................................................................................. 56 
3.4.1 Physical Unclonability ...................................................................................... 56 
3.4.2 Information Content Metrics ............................................................................ 58 
3.4.3 Security Evaluation........................................................................................... 61 
3.5 Summary ................................................................................................................. 62 
 
Chapter 4 : Deep Learning Attacks on Simulation Models of Silicon PUF ..................... 64 
4.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................. 64 
4.2 Simulation models .................................................................................................. 65 
4.2.1 Linear Spectral Filter PUF ................................................................................ 65 
4.2.2 Nonlinear PUF with a Single Spatial Mode ..................................................... 66 
4.2.3 Nonlinear PUF with Multiple Spatial Modes ................................................... 68 
4.3 Results ..................................................................................................................... 68 
4.4 Conclusion .............................................................................................................. 72 
 
Chapter 5 : Deep Learning Attacks on Silicon Photonic Physical Unclonable Function . 73 
5.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................. 73 
5.2 Results ..................................................................................................................... 76 
5.2.1 Data Collection ................................................................................................. 76 
viii  
5.2.2 Machine Learning Attacks Scenarios ............................................................... 77 
5.2.3 Direct Attack ..................................................................................................... 78 
5.2.4 Side-channel Attack .......................................................................................... 81 
5.2.5 Encryption Results ............................................................................................ 83 
5.3 Neural Network Design .......................................................................................... 84 
5.4 Conclusion .............................................................................................................. 85 
 
Chapter 6 : Deep Learning Attacks on Simulation Model of Optical Scattering Physical 
Unclonable Function ......................................................................................................... 86 
6.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................. 86 
6.2 Simulation Model .................................................................................................... 87 
6.3 Simulation Results .................................................................................................. 90 
6.4 Neural Networks Architectures ............................................................................... 95 
6.5 Conclusion .............................................................................................................. 97 
 
Chapter 7 : Conclusion and Future Directions ................................................................. 99 
Bibliography ................................................................................................................... 103 










List of Figures 
 
Figure 1.1: Schematic of Internet of Things concept indicating the end users and 
applications in various aspects of life [3]. .......................................................................... 3 
 
Figure 1.2: Growth of digital devices in the Internet of Things [4]. .................................. 4 
 
Figure 1.3: Communication of two parties with symmetric key algorithm. m – plaintext, c 
– ciphertext, k – cryptographic key, E – encryption function and D – decryption function 
[11]. ..................................................................................................................................... 7 
 
Figure 1.4: Communication of two parties with asymmetric key algorithm. m – plaintext, 
c – ciphertext, PKx – public key of user X, SKx – secret key of user X, E – encryption 
function and D – decryption function [11]. ........................................................................ 8 
 
Figure 1.5: Physical Unclonable Function Model [26]. ................................................... 11 
 
Figure 1.6: Typical authentication scheme using PUF based systems. ........................... 14 
 
Figure 1.7: Most common properties of PUF systems [67]. ............................................ 15 
 
Figure 1.8: Authentication error using like and unlike distributions. FAR – False 
Acceptance Rate, FRR – False Rejection Rate.  α – authentication decision threshold [26].
........................................................................................................................................... 20 
 
Figure 1.9: a) Arbiter PUF b) Ring Oscillator PUF [34]. ................................................ 23 
 
Figure 1.10: Principle of Coating PUF operation [34]. ................................................... 24 
 
Figure 1.11: Basic operation of optical scattering PUF [34]. .......................................... 26 
 
Figure 1.12: a) and b) are the theoretical types of integrated PUF systems. c) schematic 
illustration of the prototype [42]. ...................................................................................... 27 
 
Figure 2.1: Type of attacks on PUFs [55]. ....................................................................... 35 
 
Figure 2.2: PUFs strength and electronic compatibility trade-off [67]............................ 42 
x  
Figure 3.1: Scanning electron microscopy (SEM) image of an example PUF cavity [26].
........................................................................................................................................... 44 
 
Figure 3.2: Nonlinear processes in silicon photonic PUF. a) Variations of spectral density 
in a response at different input laser pulse energies. b) Demonstration of FWM effect in a 
cavity by inputting two 6.7 ps pulses centered at υ1 = 191.94 THz and υ2 = 192.43 THz. 
Observed sidebands are centered at υ3 = 191.57 THz and υ4 = 192.80 THz. c) Spectral 
response of the cavity and two probe measurements. d) Temporal response of the two 
probes demonstrating the showing free-carrier dispersion effects. .................................. 52 
 
Figure 3.3: An experimental setup for testing an authentication protocol. a) An 
authentication protocol where the measured response is compared to expected response 
from CRP library associated with certain PUF token. b) Using Mach-Zender Modulator 
(MZM) a sequence of ultrafast pulses sourced from mode-locked laser (MLL) are encoded 
with binary sequences from a pulse pattern generator (PPG). After a series of compression 
and amplification of pulses they are sent to photonic cavity and the measured analog 
response is detected with photodetector (PD) [67]. .......................................................... 54 
 
Figure 3.4: Post-processing algorithm for binary sequence derivation from analog 
response [67]. .................................................................................................................... 56 
 
Figure 3.5: Authentication results. a) FHD histograms for each cavity calculated against 
design 2 along with 2 additional FHD histograms corresponding to the clone of design 2 
and to the same design 48 hours later. b) Normalized FHD histograms for each design 
against every other cavity. Error bars represent ± standard deviations [67]. .................... 57 
 
Figure 3.6: Spectro-temporal input and output mapping model [69]. ............................. 60 
 
Figure 4.1: DNN attack on simulated photonic PUF. Prediction results are obtained on 
30% of CRPs (test set) after training process on 70% of CRPs (train set). Linear (blue), 
nonlinear PUF with dispersion and single spatial mode (orange) and nonlinear PUF with 
multiple spatial modes at three different input energy pulses (green, red, purple) are 
presented. For a comparison, performance of DNN on experimental dataset is also 
demonstrated (brown). Purple curve represents the accuracy of random guessing of every 
response generated by TRNG. .......................................................................................... 69 
 
Figure 4.2: DNN performance as a function of bit number kept in digitized channel. Bits 
are ordered from the most significant bits (MSB) to the least significant (LSB) ones. 
Notably, the average of prediction errors for 6 bits matches to the overall prediction error 
of DNN against CRP with 186 bits responses (86%) ....................................................... 71 
 
Figure 5.1: An adversary attack procedure. Having a subset of CRPs from the full 
challenge-response space, Eve has a limited time to design the machine learning algorithm 
in order to obtain the approximate behavior of a PUF device. Specifically, Eve trains a 
Deep Neural Network (DNN) on the stolen set of CRPs, feeds the DNN with new 
xi  
challenges and attempts to predict unobserved CRPs. If the DNN predicts the correct 
responses up to some error threshold, then PUF is considered to be compromised. ........ 75 
 
Figure 5.2: Machine Learning Attacks scenarios. a) General setup of challenge-response 
generation with hardware setup producing analog power samples response and post-
processing algorithm producing the binary version of the response b) Direct attack with 
ML model mapping binary-to-binary relationship c) Side-channel attack with ML model 
mapping binary-to-real relationship. ................................................................................. 78 
 
Figure 5.3: ML direct attack results. a) Convergence of NN generalization errors with 
respect to amount of the dataset at average pulse energy 0.36 pJ (blue), 0.72 pJ (yellow) 
and 1.7pJ (red) b) NN prediction error of each bit in channel at maximum number of 
samples used for training phase. c)Normalized FHD distributions and histograms 
calculated against CRP of legitimate PUF token at different power levels in the setup: 
“like” distribution (green) represents the FHD values between repetitions and the response 
sequence from CRP of the legitimate PUF, ML “clone” distribution (blue) represents the 
FHD values between ML predicted response sequences and the response from CRP of 
legitimate PUF. ................................................................................................................. 80 
 
Figure 5.4: Side-channel attacks results. a) Normalized MSE distributions based on 
comparison between power repetitions and averaged power sample of PUF device(green) 
and comparison on averaged power samples of PUF device and ML predicted power 
samples (blue). Note that the scale in the last figure is different from the previous two.  b) 
Normalized FHD distributions of binary response sequences obtained after post-processing 
algorithm on analog power samples.  Both charts are presented at different power of optical 
signal in the system ........................................................................................................... 82 
 
Figure 5.5: a) Original message used and corresponding decryption results for ML clone 
and genuine PUF. b) The mean BER for the message decryption using ML clone and 
legitimate PUF CRL responses at different average power levels in the system.  Inset 
pictures show the quality of decryption at various code rates. ML clone is unable to 
reconstruct the original image even at the lowest code rates. ........................................... 84 
 
Figure 6.1: Single surface scattering of the modulated plane wave using the random phase 
mask. ................................................................................................................................. 88 
 
Figure 6.2: Example of 32x32 binary pattern and corresponding obtained speckle image 
via the procedure described above. Exponential distribution of intensity values of all 
100,000 speckle images plotted for sanity checks. ........................................................... 89 
 
Figure 6.3: DNN performance on the set of 100,000 8x8 binary patterns and corresponding 
8x8 normalized speckle images. a) Speckle image generated in simulation code. b) Speckle 
image predicted by DNN c) Difference map between true and prediction speckles. d) 
RMSE distributions for DNN (centered around 0.004) and for random guessing algorithm 
(centered around 0.09). ..................................................................................................... 91 
xii  
Figure 6.4: DNN performance on the set of 100,000 16x16 binary patterns and 
corresponding 16x16 normalized speckle images. a) Speckle image generated in simulation 
code. b) Speckle image predicted by DNN c) Difference map between true and prediction 
speckles. d) RMSE distributions for DNN (centered around 0.01) and for random guessing 
algorithm (centered around 0.085). ................................................................................... 92 
 
Figure 6.5: DNN performance on the set of 100,000 32x32 binary patterns and 
corresponding 32x32 normalized speckle images. a) Speckle image generated in simulation 
code. b) Speckle image predicted by DNN c) Difference map between true and prediction 
speckles. d) RMSE distributions for DNN (centered around 0.026) and for random 
guessing algorithm (centered around 0.082). .................................................................... 92 
 
Figure 6.6: DNN performance on the set of 100,000 64x64 binary patterns and 
corresponding 64x64 normalized speckle images. a) Speckle image generated in simulation 
code. b) Speckle image predicted by DNN c) Difference map between true and prediction 
speckles. d) RMSE distributions for DNN (centered around 0.033) and for random 
guessing algorithm (centered around 0.084). .................................................................... 93 
 
Figure 6.7: DNN root mean squared error on test data for all pattern sizes and random 
guessing prediction. .......................................................................................................... 94 
 
Figure 6.8: Training time and the complexity of NNs in terms of the number of parameters 





List of Tables 
 
Table 1.1: Current and potential applications of Internet of Things [3] ………………….2 
Table 2.1: Logistic Regression attack on Arbiter PUF with 64 and 128 linear 
stages……………………………………………………………………………………. 37 
Table 2.2: Summary of ML attacks against Arbiter, XOR, Lightweight and Feed-Forward 
PUFs.…………………………………………………………………………………......38 

















Chapter 1 : Introduction and Overview 
 
In this dissertation, we investigate a novel approach of generating and reliably 
storing vast amounts of digital key material within a complex physical object. Such objects 
are known as physical unclonable functions (PUFs) and have potential applications in 
secure authentication, anti-counterfeiting, and data encryption. Specifically, the extraction 
of private information from a PUF can be used for encryption/decryption of stored material 
or of a communication channel or also as a unique signature for granting the access to a 
system or verifying the authenticity of an object. The development and implementation of 
the photonic PUFs investigated here require knowledge from multiple disciplines including 
integrated optics, dynamical systems, nonlinear and ultrafast optics, information theory, 
and cryptography. Specifically, in this dissertation, we study a cryptographic device based 
on the ultrafast optical interactions in an integrated silicon photonic cavity. The cavity’s 
behavior results from a mixture of fundamental physical processes underlying the 
extremely complex light-matter interaction achieved at the operating conditions. In detail, 
the characterization of the device requires the consideration of a number of phenomena in 
the areas of nonlinear optics, ultrafast optics, and semiconductor physics. In practice, the 
nonlinear optical behavior is typically avoided in other optical systems since it often 
distorts signals of interests and can introduce instability and noise. On the contrary, in this 
work, we exploit a range of nonlinear optical processes and benefit from the additional 
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complexity and signal distortion during the device’s operation. The research here includes 
the description of these optical processes and their impact on the reliability and security of 
optical PUFs as cryptographic devices. 
 
1.1 Internet of Things and Digital Era 
The concept of the Internet of Things (IoT) was first introduced back in early 1999 
by K. Ashton who was a brand manager at Procter & Gamble [1]. Studying the data of 
supply chains led him to deploy Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) tags on shop 
inventory, thus allowing early “talk” of Things between each other. With the progress of 
technology, the definition of Things has changed, although the main goal of keeping Things 
interconnected still remains the same.  
Ever since the phrase Internet of Things was born, it received a variety of 
definitions, including the Network of Everything or Network of Objects or Internet of 
People [2]. Despite all these descriptions, what remains truly undoubted is the fact that IoT 
is approaching our day to day lives inevitably and silently. Presently, one of the popular 
perceptions of the IoT concept is the global network of digital devices interconnected with 
standard communications protocols. In order to clarify this concept, let me give some 




Table 1.1: Current and potential applications of Internet of Things [3] 
 
Figure 1.1 summarizes that with IoT anything/anybody in the world will be able to connect 
to internet from any place in the world. 
 
Figure 1.1: Schematic of Internet of Things concept indicating the end users and 
applications in various aspects of life [3]. 
 
It is clear now that IoT is the next revolution of technology leading to the 
transformation of our society at all levels. The current state of IoT is still in the emerging 
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phase, consisting of 25 billion devices connected to each other [3]. According to Cisco’s 
network growth forecasts (Figure 1.2) the number of connected devices on the internet 
will exceed 50 billion by 2020 and by 2022 the world will be drowning in 1 trillion sensors 
[4]. One of the most important consequences of this trend is the rapid increase in the 
amount of data that will be generated by each device in the network. Unprecedented 
amounts of data will have to be managed, stored and protected requiring novel 
technologies. The proliferation of such amounts of data will inevitably magnify security 
threats of the network, lead to authentication problems, access control, privacy of the data 
and its confidentiality. Therefore, it is critically important to understand whether we are 
prepared for such dramatic changes at this level of pace and how we are planning to solve 
the problems mentioned above.  
 
Figure 1.2: Growth of digital devices in the Internet of Things [4]. 
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Keeping data private and secure has always been a challenging task. The need for 
providing secured information has existed for centuries. However, in the last couple of 
decades, given the exponential growth of the amount of data generated in the world, this 
need has also exponentially grown. According to [5], in 2012 the digital world of data was 
expanded to 2.7 Zettabytes (1021 bytes) and this amount is predicted to double every two 
years [6]. Everyday 2.5 Exabytes (1018 bytes) is created along with the fact that 90% of the 
total amount of current data has been generated in the last 5 years [7]. This situation is 
astonishing and frightening at the same time. Mass media and academia are overfilled with 
numerous articles and research papers about this so-called Digital Era. Some people call it 
the Era of Big Data, others refer to it as Industry 4.0 [8]. The latter term encompasses the 
global digitalization of society, IoT, smart environment and manufacturing, cyber-physical 
systems and etc. Big IT corporations such as Google, Amazon, Apple, IBM, Microsoft and 
etc. are already in a race to achieve dominance in this emerging market providing a variety 
of services and products to efficiently store data, operate on it and securely transfer it 
between two parties.  
As we can see, there is a vast amount of problems coming in the near future and in 
this dissertation, I focus on one of them: information security of data. 
 
1.2 Information Security in a Modern World 
The main goals of information security can be classified in the following way [9]: 
• Confidentiality of data, i.e. keeping the information protected from unauthorized 
parties 
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• Authentication. Proper protocols to provide the proof of the identity as well as 
entity one is interacting with. For example, if someone wants to access a university 
library, he/she must provide a student card in order to be allowed to enter  
• Data Integrity. The communication of two parties must not be altered by an 
adversary 
• Non-repudiation, i.e. one party of a transaction cannot deny having received a 
transaction, nor can the other party deny having sent a transaction [10] 
Most of these requirements are addressed by fields such as Cryptography, which is 
providing the range of solutions being presented here. The most widespread family of 
security schemes are Symmetric Key Algorithms and Public Key Algorithms (Asymmetric 
Scheme). 
 
1.2.1 Symmetric Key Algorithms 
If two parties communicate with each other using symmetric key algorithms, they 
use cryptographic keys (exchanged apriori via secured channel or during physical meeting) 
for encryption of plaintext and decryption of ciphertext that are known for both sides. 
Those keys are shared between two parties and must be kept in secret from any external 
malicious attackers. Most of the time, the encryption and decryption keys are identical. In 
Figure 1.3, the principle of symmetric key algorithm is demonstrated [11]. The best-known 
examples of the given security scheme are DES, AES, VERNAM and One -Time - Pad 




Figure 1.3: Communication of two parties with symmetric key algorithm. m – plaintext, c 
– ciphertext, k – cryptographic key, E – encryption function and D – decryption function 
[11]. 
 
1.2.2 Asymmetric Key Algorithms 
Asymmetric Key or Public Key Algorithms revolutionized cryptography in the 
1970s and remain the most popular cryptographic system in modern security [16]. The 
system still uses a pair of keys: a public key, that can be spread widely without any 
restrictions and a private key which is known only to the owner of encryption of plaintext. 
The private key must be kept in a strict secret, otherwise the security of the whole system 
is at risk.  
In public key cryptography any person can encrypt a message using the receiver’s 
public key, however the encrypted message can only be decrypted with the receiver’s 
private key. Before the communication starts, typically the pair of public and private keys 
are generated in a fast and efficient way. The whole idea of public cryptography consists 
of the fact that it is almost impossible to computationally derive the private key knowing 
its paired public key. Systems using public key algorithms rests on mathematical problems 
that currently don’t have an efficient solution such as elliptic curves relationships, discrete 
algorithms etc. Figure 1.4 shows the general principle of communication between two 
parties utilizing public key algorithm [11]. 
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Figure 1.4: Communication of two parties with asymmetric key algorithm. m – plaintext, 
c – ciphertext, PKx – public key of user X, SKx – secret key of user X, E – encryption 
function and D – decryption function [11]. 
 
Before Alice sends the message, she fetches Bob’s public key and encrypts the 
plaintext with it. The encrypted message (ciphertext) is transmitted to Bob via a public 
channel, where on the other end Bob, using his private key decrypts the ciphertext. Public 
key cryptography is the essential ingredient in modern cryptosystems, communication 
protocols, and other applications. The most widely used RSA (Rivest-Shamir-Adleman) 
system is one of the earliest public key cryptosystems and is extensively deployed in secure 
data transmission [17]. 
 
1.3 Current Challenges in Information Security 
In the last section, I discussed that modern information security rests on 
computational asymmetry, i.e. algorithms that are easy to compute, but difficult to invert. 
This type of “one-way” property, however is not exhaustively studied and according to [18, 
19], the full security of one-way algorithms is not yet proven. For example, the SHA-1 
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cryptographic hash function was reliable until 2005, when Rijmen, et al. proposed an attack 
against it [20]. Since then many organizations have switched to more secure versions of 
hash functions (SHA-2, SHA-256). Further, with an increase of parallel computing power 
and supercomputers, asymmetric algorithms can be potentially jeopardized in the future. 
At this point, we cannot just rely on protective mechanisms ensured by algorithmic or 
mathematical security scheme. Many of the key-based mathematical algorithms are 
implemented in electronic circuits to prevent counterfeiting, frauds, and theft. However, 
the latter methods cause other issues such as insecure key storage and generation, complex 
and costly physical anti-tampering mechanisms, and cumbersome heavy designs. The 
secret key, for example, in those physical primitives must be stored in non-reliable and 
non-volatile electronic memory occupying large portions of the integrated circuit (IC). 
Moreover, cryptographic devices often have to be powered on in order to keep the memory 
active thereby increasing the cost of device manufacturing and decreasing their operation 
speed. Since the secret key is stored permanently in the digital memory in most of the 
cryptographic devices, they are highly vulnerable to adversarial attacks causing a rise of 
counterfeit market. Several reports from last year Frontier Economics indicate that the 
global market of counterfeiting and piracy could potentially reach US$2.3 trillion by 2022 
[21]. 
Complexity and insecure behavior of asymmetric cryptosystems mentioned above 
motivated much of the research to develop new alternative approaches that are reliable, 
secure, lightweight, easy to use in authentication and key storage applications and cheap to 
manufacture. Physical Unclonable Functions (PUF) offer a promising and innovative 
solution to the issues of reliable private key storage, secure authentication schemes and 
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easy operation. In the next section, I introduce the concept of a PUF and the state-of-the- 
art techniques related to this approach. 
 
1.4 Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) 
1.4.1 Concept  
The concept of a Physical Unclonable Function is closely related to the old idea of 
using intrinsic physical features to uniquely identify objects in the world. Biometric 
authentication has been known for centuries going back to early Egyptian times when 
traders were distinguished by their physical characteristics. Human fingerprints are the best 
example of such physical features which were first collected in 1891 in Argentina to track 
criminals [22]. Fingerprint authentication is a widespread security scheme nowadays for 
many reasons. Firstly, they are specific to one person and only one, thereby human 
fingerprints possess individualism. Besides this, a fingerprint is also inherent, so that every 
human on the Earth has this physical feature, unlike other identification features like a hand 
signature or name. Finally, and the most importantly, fingerprints are unclonable, hence it 
is difficult to generate identical copies of fingerprints through artificial or biological 
processes. Since times when people started using fingerprints, many other biometric 
technologies were born including voice authentication, face recognition, infrared 
thermogram, DNA and etc. 
Besides physiological features, unique identification can be implemented using 
other properties of objects. For example, at the end of the twentieth century, random 
patterns in paper fibers and optical tokens were used in unique identification of currency 
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notes and strategic arms [23, 24]. The formalization of such approaches began later in the 
early twenty-first century and initially it was introduced as a physical one-way function 
and finally as physical unclonable function or PUF.  
Mathematically, the concept of PUF is akin to the concept of an algorithmic one-
way function. These are the functions that are easy to compute, but hard to invert. A 
function that is easy to compute means that there is a polynomial computational time to 
produce the output given the input, while the difficulty of inversion indicates the negligible 
probability of finding any algorithm that finds the input given the output. Asymmetric key 
algorithms, as I discussed in section 1.2, are exactly based on this definition where it is 
almost impossible in the finite time to derive the private key from only knowing its public 
key.  
There is no strict definition of a PUF, but the one that is most frequently mentioned 
in the literature is the following. A PUF is a physical object which produces the output 
signal to the input which is dependent on physical structures which are impossible to clone 
[25]. To further accentuate, three keywords in the PUF abbreviation corresponds to specific 
requirements that have to be satisfied in each PUF instance (Figure 1.5). 
 
 
Figure 1.5: Physical Unclonable Function Model [26]. 
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a) Physical, i.e. real physical entity (not an algorithm or logical procedure). 
 b) Unclonable, i.e. cannot be replicated by any means with any infinite resources       
even by the original creator of the entity. 
 c) Function, i.e. it has to perform some operation on the given input signal and      
generate the output. In other words, it is a function in an engineering sense. 
Interest in PUFs has risen significantly over recent years leading to an increase of 
published works in this information security area. The majority of conventional 
information security approaches discussed earlier, rely on the concept of a piece of 
information that must be kept in secret in storage permanently. If an attacker finds a way 
to steal this piece of information, the whole security of the system is compromised. PUFs, 
on the other hand, suggest a novel approach to building security. The key idea in PUF is to 
leverage the small-scale random disorders that are inevitable during the manufacturing 
process of the device. Those disorders are unavoidable and uncontrollable effect during the 
fabrication of the system, making the device truly unclonable even for the original 
manufacturer that has a complete knowledge of the design. The physical structure of the 
device plays a role analogous to a fingerprint or DNA.  
PUFs offer a variety of advantages over the traditional cryptographic systems. For 
example, instead of a permanent storage of the secret key in non-volatile memory, PUFs 
derive the secret key from their behavior, which is sensitive to the unique physical random 
structure. In other words, all private information is placed in the device’s physical structure 
and can be accessed only by the holder of the device. Moreover, in PUF systems there is 
no need to keep the memory powered in order to access the private key, since the key is 
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obtained only at the time of the external stimuli, typically called challenges. On top of that, 
physical intrusion in the PUF device would inevitably and irreversibly modify the original 
PUF behavior making PUF systems tamper-evident.  
Physical Unclonable Functions prove to be a lightweight cryptographic primitive 
with a range of potential applications including low-cost authentication and secret key 
generation. In the next subsection, I consider the terminology and basic definitions of 
components associated with PUF systems that subsequently will be used throughout this 
dissertation.  
 
1.4.2 PUF Terminology 
Any PUF device queried with a specific input produces a measurable output, i.e. a 
PUF performs a functional operation. Typically, an input to a PUF is called a challenge 
and the output is called the response. An applied challenge and corresponding response are 
referred to as a challenge-response pair (CRP). The relationship between challenges and 
responses is generally called CRP behavior. The process of collection of CRPs is referred 
to as the enrollment process and the collection itself is called a CRP database or CRP 
library. I want to stress the fact that the CRP behavior is unique to one particular PUF 
token and only one. In order to be authenticated the client, who physically possesses a PUF 
device, queries it with one of the challenges from CRP library. The response produced by 
PUF is then compared to the response from CRP library. This is a standard challenge-
response authentication protocol based on PUF systems that is also demonstrated in Figure 
1.6. Another set of terms is associated with PUF security metrics that would also be 
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considered in detail in section 1.4.3 and 1.4.4.  In order to evaluate PUF performance I 
introduce two important concepts: inter-distance and intra-distance. 
• Applying a particular challenge twice to the same PUF instantiation at different 
times, the intra-distance μintra indicates the distance between two corresponding 
responses, produced at these different times by the same PUF. 
• Applying a particular challenge to two different PUF instantiations at the same 
time, the inter-distance μinter indicates the distance between two corresponding 
responses, produced by these two different PUFs. 
 
Figure 1.6: Typical authentication scheme using PUF based systems. 
 
The intra-distance of PUF token measures the reproducibility of a response with 
respect to a previous response produced from the same challenge. Unlike mathematical 
algorithms, which always produce the same output, PUFs are physical processes that 
exhibit noise and other variation. “Good” PUFs are consistent, meaning that the same 
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challenge should correspond to the same response up to a certain noise level. It is clear that 
μintra should be as small as possible since this indicates a very reliable and repeatable PUF.  
The inter-distance, on the other hand, demonstrates the degree of uniqueness of a 
PUF device, resulting in good differentiation of two systems. As a result, the value of μinter 
should be as high as possible, depending on the metrics and challenge-response 
representation.  
Overall, uniqueness and repeatability are the most important properties that an ideal 
PUF should exhibit along with the others that would be described in the next section. 
 
1.4.3 Main Properties of PUFs 
In this section, I outline the most important and frequent properties encountered 
across a variety of PUF instantiations. Physical Unclonable Functions are still an emerging 
area in hardware security, so the following list is not exhaustive and can be complemented 
by various other properties depending on the specific PUF architecture.  
Ideally, a PUF should exhibit six regularly occurring properties (Figure 1.7): 
 
 
Figure 1.7: Most common properties of PUF systems [67]. 
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a) Reproducible: The responses to different evaluations of the same challenge on the 
same PUF device should be close to each other (up to some threshold level) in the 
distance metric chosen apriori. Normally, reproducibility is measured by intra-
distance value μintra 
b) Unique: This property is self-explanatory and is derived straight from the definition 
of PUF. Different PUF devices should be unique, such that the same challenge 
given to two different devices produces significantly different responses. Normally, 
uniqueness is measured by inter-distance value μinter mentioned earlier 
c) Unclonable: This is the core property of any PUF. PUF is truly unclonable if it is 
mathematically unclonable and physically unclonable. By physical unclonability, I 
mean that it is very hard to come up with the physical design of entity which would 
emulate the same behavior as the genuine design. If it is challenging to construct a 
mathematical model or algorithm that mimics original PUF, then PUF is claimed 
to be mathematically unclonable.  Importantly, the latter gives rise to research in 
the direction of modeling attacks against PUFs, which is the focus of this 
dissertation.  
d) One – Way: Classical property coming from asymmetric cryptography describing 
the fact that it is infeasible to invert the functional operation of PUF.  
e) Unpredictable: This property is very similar to unclonability. If an adversary can 
predict the outcome of PUF for a chosen challenge, then PUF is considered to be 
spoofed. One way to do that is to observe the subset of CRP library and build a 
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mathematical model that learns PUF behavior based only on this subset.  In the next 
chapter, I will go over attacks against PUFs in a detail. 
f) Tamper – Evident: Tampering is the process of making changes to the integrity of 
physical entity. Since the whole point of PUF is in random physical idiosyncrasies 
it is clear that tampering the device would change PUF behavior forever. 
Another important thing to consider while dealing with PUF systems is related to 
environment influence on the operation of PUF.  During the physical measurement and 
response generation, there are a number of unwanted physical effects that could interfere 
with the final results. For example, the repeatability property of specific PUF instance can 
be affected by fluctuations of temperature or input power. Most of these factors carry the 
systematic effects, so there is a range of approaches developed to reduce their influence: 
 
• One technique is called compensation, where instead of measuring the absolute 
values of responses, the differences between those are measured. Following this 
way, the influence of the environment is reduced, and the system is considered to 
be more robust. 
• Another simple approach is to manually select those responses that turned out to 
be stable and robust and ignore other responses influenced by the environment the 
most. 
Environmental effects are highly dependent on the specific implementation details of a 
given PUF. Certain designs do not require any of the approaches mentioned above and this 
will be observed in section 1.4.6 where I present a variety of PUF implementations. 
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1.4.4 PUF: metrics and evaluations 
Given all the definitions and properties of PUFs, one needs to raise a question of 
the evaluation of PUF design quality. The most common set of evaluation metrics includes 
robustness, uniqueness, and unclonability. 
Let me consider a PUF as a function f(•) with some provided challenge ci and a 
produced response ri = f( ci). In an ideal noiseless system, the repeated challenges applied 
to a PUF provide the same response. However, practically due to various phenomena such 
as noise, some misalignments in the system, optical fiber-to-waveguide conversion losses, 
surface impurities and etc., PUFs have small variations in the measured responses. 
Therefore, it is important to define the “distance” between the responses and evaluate the 
repeatability of the system based on it. Typically, in the research community, Fractional 
Hamming Distance (FHD) is one popular metric and is defined as the number of positions 
in which two binary sequences of the same length differ [25]. The FHD value is confined 
to the range of [0, 1], where FHD = 1 means that two sequences are different at all positions 
(i.e. identical but inverted), while FHD = 0 means that two sequences are identical. Two 
ideally unique and random sequences will thus have an FHD = 0.5.  
To estimate how close the evaluations of challenges are, we compute FHD between 
all the subsequent responses, corresponding to the same interrogations applied to PUF. 
Then, plotting FHD values on a histogram plot, we obtain the distribution that is, normally, 
referred to as same or sometimes like distribution. The mean and width of the FHD 
distribution indicate the repeatability and error rate of the system. The mean of the 
distribution is also the intra-distance μintra mentioned earlier. PUFs that are robust and 
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repeatable have the like distribution centered around 0 with ideally a small standard 
deviation. Therefore, FHD distribution is a convenient mathematical tool to estimate the 
repeatability of PUF.  
Now, let me consider two different PUF devices f(•) and g(•). Applying one 
specific challenge ci, two PUFs generate corresponding responses ri
1
 = f(ci) and ri
2
 = g(ci). 
Then I calculate FHD (ri
1, ri
2) ∀  i= 1..N, where N – is the total number of challenge-
response pairs. The distribution of FHD values, in this case, is called different or unlike 
distribution, where the mean of it indicates the uniqueness of the certain PUF. Therefore, 
if two PUFs generate uncorrelated responses to the same applied challenge, then the mean 
of unlike distribution should be centered around 0.5.  The mean of the unlike distribution 
is also the inter-distance μinter mentioned earlier.  
Lastly, to estimate the unclonability property of certain PUF implementation, we 
follow the same procedure of calculating FHD values, but instead of comparing responses 
from different devices we compare the responses from clones of one PUF. The closer the 
mean of obtained FHD distribution to 0.5 the harder to clone PUF.  
In a typical authentication scenario, as was mentioned in section 1.4.2, expected 
responses from CRP library are compared to measured responses during authentication. 
Since the means of the like and unlike distributions are not exactly centered around 0 and 
0.5 (due to noise effects, environmental factors, etc.) a specific threshold value α is set. If 
FHD value between the measured response and the expected response is below α then PUF 
is deemed authentic, otherwise it is unauthentic. In Figure 1.8 [26] like and unlike 
distributions are presented and it is shown how to define the authentication threshold. 
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Figure 1.8: Authentication error using like and unlike distributions. FAR – False 
Acceptance Rate, FRR – False Rejection Rate.  α – authentication decision threshold [26]. 
 
Two other important characteristics the false acceptance ratio (FAR) and false 
rejection ratio (FRR) of PUF are defined as the probability of accepting the wrong 
responses and the probability of rejecting the correct responses respectively.  
To complete this section, I conclude that ideal PUF performance is reflected in 
terms of the characteristics mentioned above. High-quality PUFs have a significant 
separation of like and unlike FHD distributions and correspondingly a very low FAR and 
FRR. For uniqueness and unclonability, it is typically preferred that unlike distributions 
are centered around 0.5 with a small width of distribution so that responses are well 
uncorrelated. For repeatability and robustness of PUF system, it is typically preferred to 
have like distributions centered around 0 with a small width of distribution.  
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1.4.5 Types of PUFs 
Given the huge number of PUF proposals and architectures, there is a need to 
systematically categorize their designs. One-way PUFs can be classified as based on the 
material used to manufacture the device. Early PUF systems such as random fiber structure 
of paper or optical scattering medium for reflection of light were based on non-electronic 
technologies. On the other side, there is a big class of PUFs containing electronic circuits 
integrated on a chip. Therefore, all the designs can be further categorized as electronic and 
non-electronic. I present the overview of the best examples of each class in the section 
1.4.6. 
Another popular way of classification of PUF systems is based on the source of 
randomness. As Guajardo et al. initially suggested, PUFs that satisfy the following two 
conditions [9, 27]: i) evaluations are performed internally within the PUF setup ii) random 
physical idiosyncrasies are implicitly introduced during the manufacturing process, are 
called intrinsic PUFs. In extrinsic designs, responses are typically evaluated externally, 
and random features are introduced explicitly. For example, one of the popular PUF 
systems is called coating PUF, where the surface of an electronic chip is sprayed with 
randomly distributed dielectric particles [28], so the randomness of the system is explicitly 
generated during the manufacturing.  
The last classification approach and the most relevant to this dissertation is based 
on security parameters of CRP behavior. In this regard, PUFs can be distinguished as a 
weak or strong PUFs. The main difference between those two types is in the domain of 
CRP library or the total number of possible CRPs. A weak PUF generally have a very small 
number (sometimes even one) of CRPs whereas strong PUFs are characterized by a huge 
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set of challenge-response pairs. This distinction has an immediate effect on usage scenarios 
and adversarial attack scenarios against weak and strong PUFs. To “hack” weak PUF one 
simply needs to know all the CRPs and there are very few of them, whereas attacking 
strong PUFs it is much more challenging as characterizing the CRP space within a limited 
timeframe is exceedingly difficult due to the large CRP dataset. Clearly, strong PUFs 
exhibits higher security than weak PUFs, hence they are generally used in different 
application areas. 
 
1.4.6 PUF Implementations 
In this subsection, I review a non-exhaustive list of various PUF proposals and 
designs each of which has their own advantages and drawbacks. This list includes optical 
[29, 30], electronic [4, 28], acoustic [28] and coating PUFs [28]. As it is shown later, optical 
systems promise higher resistance to adversarial attacks and exhibit stronger security in 
general, while electronic PUFs are still vulnerable to cloning. On the other hand, electronic 
PUFs are much easier to implement and integrate on silicon chip allowing for mass 
production and inexpensive manufacturing. Generally, optical approaches are much more 
complex systems requiring high-precision mechanisms and bulky setups.  
 
1.4.6.1 Electronic PUFs 
Electronic PUFs with innate randomness coming from delayed measurements of a 
signal are called delay – based intrinsic PUFs. One the most popular approaches using this 
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technique are Arbiter PUF [31, 32] and Ring Oscillator PUF [4, 33].  In Figure 1.9 
schematic diagrams for both of architectures are presented:  
 
 
Figure 1.9: a) Arbiter PUF b) Ring Oscillator PUF [34]. 
 
The basic idea of Arbiter PUF is a race condition on two electronic signals 
propagating through two paths on a chip. The arbiter module indicates which of the two 
paths won the race by detecting the signal that comes earliest to the module. The intrinsic 
randomness of Arbiter PUF comes from the fact that during the chip manufacturing process 
it is impossible to fabricate two paths with zero delay between them. Therefore, there is 
always a small random offset between the two delays. Moreover, Arbiter PUF consists of 
so-called switch blocks in the initial design [31, 32]. By choosing the way of connecting 
inputs to outputs (straight or crossed), the challenge signal is set up. The number of unique 
challenges in Arbiter PUF is exponential in the number of those switch blocks making 
Arbiter PUF a strong PUF.  
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Another approach based on delays in electronic signals is Ring Oscillator PUF.  
According to the diagram above, the output of delay block is fed back to its input making 
this block as an oscillating loop. The frequency of this oscillator depends on the amount of 
the delay introduced in each round of signal propagation. Random manufacturing 
variations make this frequency also random and unpredictable. Typically, the delay is 
parametrized by the external challenge and in the initial proposal of Ring Oscillators they 
were used in pairs in parallel so that the counter blocks are compared between two delay 
blocks. The number of ways to choose two oscillators out of total number N oscillators is 
proportional to N2 thereby making Ring Oscillators correspond to the class of weak PUFs. 
Two PUF constructions described above were based on the random delays during 
the fabrication of chips. Besides that, there is a plenty of other electronic PUFs based on 
fluctuations and instabilities of digital memory such as SRAM (static random-access 
memory) [27], Butterfly [35], Latch PUFs [36] etc. On top of that, extrinsic PUFs such as 
Coating PUF (Figure 1.10) is also considered an electronic PUF as discussed earlier [28]:  
 
Figure 1.10: Principle of Coating PUF operation [34]. 
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In Coating PUF random features are introduced not during the manufacturing but 
by explicit spraying of the dielectric coating on top of the sensors on the chip. After that, 
the capacitance of surfaces of comb-shaped sensors is measured and written down in the 
CRP library as a response. The challenge in this approach plays the role as the sensor itself.  
Here, I presented a concise list of the most common electronic PUF architectures 
so that the reader can have a general idea of details of techniques and implementations. 
Although electronic PUFs remain the most common approach, due to easy and cheap 
production and the ability to integrate them on silicon chips, many research papers have 
found them to be susceptible to cloning, model building attacks, and invasive attacks. For 
example, given the linear structure of Arbiter PUF, mathematical algorithms have been 
developed to be able to predict the response to a certain challenge [37, 38]. To leverage the 
security of Arbiter PUFs many other modifications were proposed such as Feed-Forward, 
XOR, Lightweight architectures, but even these countermeasures failed to resist simple 
machine learning attacks using logistic regression or support vector machines [38 – 40].  
In addition, electronic weak PUFs with finite CRP library size are easy targets for 
adversaries to read out all CRPs and fully characterize the device. Given all the weaknesses 
of electronic PUFs, there is significant recent interest in developing other PUF 
constructions based on different materials or on a completely different scheme. 
 
1.4.6.2 Optical PUFs 
Pappu et al. first proposed an optical PUF in 2001 where he gave a comprehensive 
overview of Physical One – Way Functions (POWF) [29].  The basic idea of Pappu’s 
approach was to exploit an optical inhomogeneous medium filled with glass spheres (500 
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μm). This token was illuminated by a continuous beam of a HeNe laser and due to multiple 
scattering of the light the speckle pattern was detected on the CCD camera ready for further 
computational processing. The variation of the orientation of laser results in different 
speckle patterns thereby making the angle of illumination a challenge and Gabor filtered 
(the special case of Fourier transform) speckle image a response. The scattering medium 
in this approach is impossible to copy even for the original manufacturer of the token due 
to inherent random small-scale fluctuations of the microsphere positions. It is also tamper 
evident since the physical intrusion of an attacker will destroy the original design of the 
medium. The basic operation of optical PUF is depicted in Figure 1.11 [34]. Even though 
Pappu’s PUF was never successfully attacked and remains to be very secure, there are 
plenty of shortcomings associated with this system. First, optical scattering setup requires 
a free space optics which is hard to align and stabilize. 
 
Figure 1.11: Basic operation of optical scattering PUF [34]. 
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This results in unstable and error-prone readout of speckle patterns harming the 
repeatability and consistency of the PUF. Further, the large setup with the precise 
mechanical positioning of laser and slow readout speed make the whole system complex 
and expensive to build. The latter motivated researchers to find another way to miniaturize 
Pappu’s method onto a single device and provide more integrated and more robust designs 
such as the Optical Scattering PUF probed via a spatial light modulator (SLM) developed 
by Horstmeyer et al. [41]. In this technique rather than changing the position of the laser 
source, Horstmeyer et al. utilized an SLM to modulate the phase of an optical wavefront 
that is further focused on the scattering token. The results turned out to be slightly more 
stable and robust, therefore, more repeatable. Later in 2013, the same idea of exploiting a 
volumetric scattering medium was refined by Rühmair et al. who proposed an integratable 
optical PUF [42]. Instead of a single laser source, he suggested two theoretical approaches 
where in the first scheme he proposed an immobile array of phase-locked laser diodes to 
illuminate the disordered scattering medium (Figure 1.12a). Each of diodes can be 
independently switched on and off leading to 2k challenges, where k is the number of diodes 
in the array. In the second approach, he proposed a single laser source that passes a light 
modulator array as it is shown in Figure 1.12b. Lastly, Rühmair built a real experimental 
prototype (Figure1.12c) where he investigated the security of the system. 
 
Figure 1.12: a) and b) are the theoretical types of integrated PUF systems. c) schematic 
illustration of the prototype [42]. 
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Intriguing recent optical approaches are based on exploiting a scattering medium 
with quantum challenges consisting of several photons state. The main idea of the method 
developed by Goorden et al. is in quantum secure authentication (QSA) where adversarial 
attacks are excluded by the quantum mechanical properties where exact determination the 
quantum state of photons is prohibited given the small number of photons [43]. QSA 
exhibits greater security, but building the aforementioned system is still expensive and 
laborious with limited readout time of responses (100 ms).  
During the last two decades since the first optical PUF was proposed there is a 
variety of other techniques such as laser surface authentication [44], authentication 
schemes using CDs [45] and etc. The main barrier for widespread practical usage of those 
techniques is the slow operation of the setup, their size, and complexity as well as the cost 
not to mention a high vulnerability to adversarial attacks in many implementations. In 
general, optical PUFs are proven to be more secure and resistant to third party attacks but 
this comes at the cost of complexity of the system. Given all the aforementioned practical 
and theoretical challenges, it is highly important to develop more advanced optical PUF 
technology that is easy to build, cheap and compatible with electronic circuits, fast in terms 
of readout and key generation, resistant to adversaries and possessing large information 
content.  
In Chapter 3 I present a new class of PUF systems called photonic PUFs developed 
by our group [26]. Photonic PUFs benefit from a range of factors such as usage of CMOS-
compatible silicon materials, operation in telecommunications spectrum bands, 
compatibility with electronic integration, large optical nonlinearity, and large information 
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density. Those benefits make photonic PUFs an attractive and desirable choice for 
information security applications. 
 
1.5 Applications of PUFs 
PUFs are mainly used in two areas of hardware cryptography: system identification 
and secure key generation.  
 
1.5.1 Low-Cost Authentication 
The challenge-response protocol allows PUFs to be a secure and inexpensive 
way to authenticate the objects. The CRP library that is collected during the 
enrollment phase can be securely stored on a server and when the client wishes to, 
for example, access his/her bank account, some set of CRPs are chosen from the 
library and applied to the client’s PUF circuit in a secure terminal. Measured 
responses are compared with the expected responses to determine authenticity. It is 
very important that challenges should be chosen at random to prevent malicious 
attacks. 
This standard protocol was implemented on RFID tags [46, 47]. According 
to this paper, utilizing 128-bit response results in few parts per billion of FAR and 
FRR values. The use of PUFs has also been suggested in anti-counterfeiting of 
integrated circuits by embedding the PUF within the integrated circuit [48]. 
Furthermore, PUFs are well suited for a variety of other fields such as IP protection 
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and tracking [27], smart credit cards with built-in PUF chips [49], wireless sensor 
network security [50] etc. 
 
1.5.2 Key Generation 
In any encryption and secure information communication scheme a secret key is 
required. PUFs are found to be useful sources of such keys since the functional operation 
of PUF devices is ideally random and can’t be duplicated. The first proposal for a secret 
key generation was by Suh et al. [51] and then later was studied by O’Donnell et al. [52] 
in the context of random number generation. As I mentioned earlier, the responses of PUF 
systems are typically noisy and highly dependent on the environmental conditions 
preventing the direct usage of a PUFs output as a source of a reliable secret key. Generally, 
after the responses are measured the implementation of error correction techniques such as 
fuzzy extractors are adopted in order to increase the privacy and security of generated key 
[53, 54]. The main idea of fuzzy extractors is to provide the secure, uniformly random and 
reliably reproducible random output from the noisy response generated by certain 
cryptographic primitive.  
 
1.6 Dissertation Outline 
To summarize this introductory chapter, I presented an overview of the concept of 
Physical Unclonable Functions, their main goals and challenges encountered in the existing 
cryptographic primitives. I discussed how PUFs can potentially solve the aforementioned 
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limitations such as non-reliable storage of secret keys, susceptibility to cloning and 
duplication, non-compatibility with electronic circuits. 
The rest of this dissertation is structured in the following way: 
In Chapter 2, I present an overview of adversarial attacks against PUF systems 
using various approaches such as Machine Learning attacks, Side Channel attacks, Invasive 
and Non- invasive attacks depending on the type of PUF. I investigate the trade-offs 
between attacking Strong and Weak PUFs. I provide the most up to date results of spoofing 
Electronic PUFs, perspectives and ideas of attacking Optical PUFs and describe the main 
challenges associated with it. On a final note, I give a brief motivation for developing novel 
optical PUF system that is resistant to Numerical Attacks and compatible with CMOS 
platforms. 
In Chapter 3, I present the silicon photonic PUF, which is the primary focus of this 
dissertation. I describe the main characteristics of this PUF device: repeatability and 
uniqueness, information capacity and key generation rates. I briefly describe the physical 
processes that influence light propagation inside the cavity and in particular the influence 
of nonlinear optical phenomena. I conclude Chapter 3 by raising a question regarding the 
unclonability of silicon photonic PUF, hence motivating the research work of constructing 
a numerical modeling attack on it. 
In Chapter 4 theoretical investigations of attacking a simplified silicon photonic 
PUF is presented. I simulate the propagation of light in the device under different scenarios 
introducing a step by step nonlinear optical phenomena: dispersion, self-phase modulation, 
etc. In each scenario I conduct the set of machine learning attacks against challenge-
response behavior gathered throughout the simulation codes.  
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In Chapter 5 I construct machine learning attacks against an experimental silicon 
photonic PUF using experimentally acquired data. I utilize a Deep Neural Network as a 
machine learning method since it was acknowledged as the state-of-the-art technique 
outperforming other traditional solutions such as Support Vector Machines or Random 
Forests.  I demonstrate that unlike the simplified simulated processes, silicon photonic 
PUFs are resistant to two possible attack scenarios. I conclude that this resistance is rooted 
in the true complexity of the optical nonlinearity and the sensitivity to precise conditions 
resulting from the device’s ray chaotic design. Lastly, I investigate the application to 
encrypted data storage and compare the results of decryption using genuine PUF device 
and machine learning “clone”. 
In Chapter 6 I investigate eavesdropper (Eve) attacks against a simulated optical 
scattering PUF. Similar to silicon photonic PUF attacks, I first generate the CRP library 
via speckle simulation codes. Having this artificial dataset, I provide machine learning 
algorithms attempting to emulate the challenge-response behavior. Further, being in an 
attacker role, I explore the amount of total CRP dataset the adversary has to possess in 
order to successfully spoof a scattering PUF as a function of device size. In other words, I 
answer the important question of the minimum subset of CRP database an adversary should 
have in order to successfully predict the response to any given challenge. 
In Chapter 7, I conclude this work with an overview of future steps in this direction. 
Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning are fast-growing areas with novel approaches 
introduced from year to year. I demonstrate that silicon photonic PUF is resistant to the 
state-of-the art family of algorithms referred to as Deep Learning, but it is more important 
to ensure its resistance to future algorithms. Regarding the optical scattering PUF, there 
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are still several challenges that exist including the stability of the system in general as well 
as the study of its security. Therefore, the next steps in this direction would be to apply ML 
attacks against experimental data and investigate the dependence of the results on a range 
of parameters such as the size of the scattering volume, the dimension of the CRP space, 































Chapter 2 : Attacks on PUF systems 
2.1 Introduction 
Physically Unclonable Functions are a promising security technology that has a 
strong identification capability and can be applied in authentication as well as secure 
communication. Theoretical works on applying PUFs presume that PUFs are reliable and 
not susceptible to adversary cryptographic primitives due to their unclonability, uniqueness 
and repeatability properties. However, it has been shown that most electronic PUFs can be 
emulated with software algorithms. On top of that, there is no comprehensive study on the 
full unclonability of electronic PUFs making such security analysis an ongoing area of 
research.  
In this chapter, I present an overview of different attack methods targeted against 
various PUF systems. Specifically, it was shown that certain PUF constructions are 
susceptible to attacks ranging from invasive to non-invasive attacks [55]. Invasive attacks 
are typically accompanied by physical modification of the PUF to study its structure and 
understand its implementation. Non-invasive attacks, on the other hand, are implemented 
without any physical interaction with PUF. This last type of attack is generally applicable 
solely to Strong PUFs due to their huge domain of CRP database.  
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Figure 2.1: Type of attacks on PUFs [55]. 
 
According to Figure 2.1, weak PUFs and strong PUFs are generally attacked in 
different ways. Numerical Attacks are not relevant for Weak PUFs due to the insignificant 
size of the CRP library. To characterize the weak PUF system it is sufficient to read out all 
the challenge-response pairs within a reasonable time window and thus with complete 
knowledge of the Weak PUF’s behavior numerical attacks are irrelevant. Therefore, to 
keep Weak PUF secure all CRPs must be kept secret.  
 
2.2 Attacks on Weak PUFs 
Generally, to break the security of Weak PUFs fault injection and physical 
tampering methods are adopted. According to [56], fault injection attacks aim to introduce 
erroneous behavior in a device by manipulating it in some way leading to the faulty 
recovery of the key. These manipulations could be introduced in many ways, e.g., exposing 
the device to extreme environmental conditions or injecting a transient fault to specific 
components of the device. The Ring Oscillator PUF, that was described in section 1.4.6.1, 
can be broken by increasing the fraction of unstable CRPs during the enrollment phase 
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under change of environmental factors such as temperature, DC supply voltage [57]. 
Memory-based PUF systems are also shown to be attacked successfully exploiting fault 
injection method where Oren at al. cloned SRAM (static random-access memory) PUFs 
using the remanence effect of memory decay, where the data, written in a volatile memory, 
is typically not immediately lost after power-off [58]. In addition, SRAM PUFs are 
susceptible to physical tampering attacks and side-channel analysis [59]. Rühmair et al. 
demonstrated the emulation attacks on Ring Oscillator PUF, where he selected the most 
straightforward way of reading out all CRPs in a database, size of which is O(k2), where k 
– is the total number of oscillators [37]. Applying the quicksort algorithm to all the 
frequency outputs of PUF, he was able to obtain prediction results surpassing 99% 
accuracy with a different number of oscillators in the system. Importantly, the whole 
procedure of attacking takes a polynomial time since it is based on sorting algorithms.  
Relative to Weak PUFs, Strong PUFs exhibit higher security potential in terms of 
resistance to adversary leading to the development of other attacking methods that are 
covered in the next section. 
 
2.3 Attacks on Strong PUFs 
Currently, the most relevant attacks on Strong PUFs are called modeling attacks 
[37, 60, 40]. Unlike Weak PUFs, Strong PUFs possess a sufficiently large CRP space that 
it is presumed to be ineffective to capture the entire CRP space. In modeling attacks, an 
adversary (Eve) presumably has acquired a subset of the CRP space associated with the 
attacked PUF. Then Eve uses this subset to derive a numerical model, which is an algorithm 
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or computational procedure that mimics the behavior of the authentic PUF by providing 
the correct responses to an arbitrary challenge with relatively high accuracy. If one finds 
such an algorithm, then the security of PUF is compromised. One of the most popular and 
powerful tools among modeling attacks is based on artificial intelligence and machine 
learning [62]. I would like to stress again that modeling attacks on Weak PUFs are 
inappropriate since the core idea of machine learning model is to learn PUF behavior based 
on the subset of the extremely large CRP database only. Weak PUFs have a few CRPs or 
sometimes even one. Therefore, no emulation of weak PUF based on known CRPs is 
needed.  
Considerable effort has taken place to successfully attack electronic PUFs including 
Arbiter PUF and its variations. Rühmair et al. in his survey presented the extensive existing 
research in attacking Arbiter, XOR, Feed – Forward and Lightweight Arbiter PUFs using 
Logistic Regression (LR), Evolution Strategies (ES) and Support Vector Machines (SVM) 
techniques that are studied in ML community [37, 62]. The simplest form of an Arbiter 
PUF that consists of a sequence of k stages was successfully attacked by LR where the 
subset of CRPs was used for training step and the rest of CRPs was used as a test set. 
Mathematically, Arbiter PUF can be represented as linear delay model, where the final 
delay ∆ = ?⃗⃗? 𝑇 Ф⃗⃗⃗  is the sum of intermediate delays at each stage, where ?⃗⃗?  is the parameter 
vector of corresponded delays and Ф⃗⃗⃗  is a feature vector of applied challenge both with k+1 
dimension (including bias). [63]. Taking the sign function of the final delay, sgn(∆) the 
response of Arbiter PUF can be calculated. This response serves as a label for supervised 
learning during the training step. Hence, given the described mathematical model of 
Arbiter PUF, I obtain a typical classification task in machine learning. Logistic regression 
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is a natural method to tackle this problem where LR determines the decision boundary by 
learning a parameter vector via maximum likelihood optimization steps. The whole 
optimization is carried out using the known to adversary CRPs and after the parameter 
vector is optimized the final prediction results of LR are evaluated on unknown CRPs. The 
best results among other ML algorithms (SVM and ES) were achieved by LR and are 
shown in the table below [37]: 
ML Method Number of stages Prediction Rate CRPs 













Table 2.1: Logistic Regression attack on Arbiter PUF with 64 and 128 linear stages. 
 
It is clear that the Arbiter PUF is easily emulated by a mathematical model with the 
accuracy of > 99% using the certain size of CRP database. It is important to point out that 
a PUF is considered to be attacked successfully if the computational complexity of the 
adversary’s model is a low-degree polynomial in terms of Arbiter PUF stages. Rühmair et 
al. demonstrated that this condition is satisfied in his experiments showing that the total 






 ), where k is the number of stages in 
arbiter PUF and 𝜀 is the classification error of LR. Thus, the Arbiter PUF in its simplest 
form is vulnerable to mathematical clonability, which has led to the development of 
modifications to strengthen the resilience against machine learning. One well-known 
possible way to reinforce the Arbiter PUF is to use the XOR Arbiter PUF architecture, 
where l number of Arbiter PUFs are used in parallel each with k stages. The same challenge 
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is applied to all l Arbiter PUFs and the global response is an XOR operation of individual 
outputs. Another approach to make Arbiter PUF more secure is a Lightweight PUF that 
has similar to XOR architecture but each individual Arbiter PUF is interrogated with its 
own challenge bit sequence [64]. Lastly, the most resilient Arbiter PUF variant against ML 
attacks is called Feed-Forward Arbiter PUF [31, 63]. In this approach, some of the stages 
are not subjected to external challenge bits but rather dependent on the delay values 
accumulated at stages before. According to Rühmair et al. even these new modifications 
can still be broken with Logistic Regression or Evolution Strategies. The main results are 







Table 2.2: Summary of ML attacks against Arbiter, XOR, Lightweight and Feed-Forward 
PUFs. 
 
On a final note, it has been found that all Arbiter-based PUFs are successfully 
attacked with both low-degree polynomial training time and the number of internal 
parameters. Besides the vulnerability to attacks, the instability of XOR-based approaches 
increases with the number of stages harming the essential repeatability properties of an 
ideal PUF system.  
For the sake of a complete picture, there is a vast number of other machine learning 
techniques such as Bagging & Boosting, Ensemble Learning, Unsupervised learning that 
are also used to perform modeling attacks against Strong PUFs [61, 65]. With the advent 












Arbiter N/A LR 128 99.9% 39.2 2.10 sec 
XOR 5 LR 128 99.0% 500 16:36 hrs 
Lightweight 5 LR 128 99.0% 1000 267 days 
FF 8 ES 64 95.5% 50 46 days 
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of massive computation power and data parallelism, Deep Learning (DL) techniques have 
rapidly become the dominant and most powerful tool outperforming conventional machine 
learning algorithms on benchmark tests in artificial intelligence research. Yashiro et al. 
showed that DL can also be used as a successful modeling attack against PUF primitives 
[66].  
So far, I have discussed attacks against electronic Strong PUFs.  Surprisingly, very 
few attacks have been reported against optical PUFs. Specifically, the original scattering 
PUF designed by Pappu et al. has never been successfully broken due to multiple reasons 
including extremely large information content (2.37 x 1010 challenges), complex optical 
refractions within the scattering medium and practical limitations such as confined 
illumination area of the medium [30, 37]. Given these factors, non-integrated scattering 
optical PUFs demonstrate an unprecedented level of security, although unfortunately at the 
cost of laborious, expensive, impractical implementation. However, the more practical 
integrated optical PUF prototypes developed by Rühmair et al. turned out to be broken by 
Linear Regression models [42]. The main assumptions of the attacks in the given paper 
are: i) linear scattering medium, ii) an adversary has a direct access to raw speckle images. 
Moreover, as it has been claimed in [42] to remedy the failure of resistance to attacks, 
Rühmair et al. suggested exploiting nonlinear scattering materials that is still an essential 
open problem in the research. 
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2.4 Security vs Practicality 
After a review of electronic and optical PUF constructions, there is one clear trade-
off that can be identified. Optical PUFs are shown to be much more robust to malicious 
attacks and unclonable, but the construction of devices, as well as compatibility with 
electronic chips, are very challenging. At the same time, electronic PUFs are widespread 
in usage and easily integrated with chips, but they are easily threatened by modeling and 
invasive attacks. For clearer demonstration, I show different PUF devices on a 2D plane 
where the y-axis indicates the compatibility with electronic circuits, while x-axis measures 
the strength of PUF in terms of challenge domain size. Figure 2.1 is rather qualitative than 
quantitative to give a better general view of the most up to date trends in PUF research 
area. Scattering based and Quantum PUFs, as it was mentioned earlier, are very robust 
systems with low perspective of embedding them on chips. The brightest examples of 
electronic PUFs such as Arbiter, SRAM and Ring Oscillators were initially and inherently 
in nature designed on silicon platforms. 
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Figure 2.2: PUFs strength and electronic compatibility trade-off [67]. 
 
Given this landscape, it is natural to raise the question of developing a new 
approach that potentially can possess advantages from both types of PUFs. Specifically, a 
new PUF technology should satisfy the following requirements: 
a) easy integration with semiconductor electronic circuits 
b) simple and cheap to produce 
c) robust during its operation and reliable in usage 
d) complex enough to resist machine learning attacks 
The answer to this question, I believe, can be found in integrated silicon photonics with the 
introduction of a new class of devices termed as silicon photonic PUFs. Photonic PUFs 
benefit from a complexity of optical interactions and at the same time are easily compatible 
with well-developed silicon microelectronics platforms. The optical operating wavelength 
of silicon photonic PUFs allows them to be compatible with telecommunications 
infrastructure thus minimizing the additional costs of future deployment of these devices. 
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Further, the silicon as a core material of photonic PUFs is well-known for offering a variety 
of complex nonlinear optical effects under specific external conditions. This can be used 
for maximizing the complexity of device operation as well as the security enhancement. 
As a result, photonic PUFs demonstrate a promising alternative for developing highly 
secure, robust and repeatable, low size, and cost source of private information for potential 
applications in a hardware integrity and information security. In the next chapter, I present 





















Chapter 3 : Silicon Photonic Physical 
Unclonable Function 
 
The original work was developed by Grubel et al. [67, 68, 69] and here I review the 
main properties that are the most relevant to the rest of this dissertation. 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The Silicon Photonic PUF was first introduced by Grubel et al in 2017 [26, 67, 68, 
69]. It is the novel CMOS-compatible cryptographic device based on ultrafast nonlinear 
optical interactions in a silicon microcavity that is designed as a disk-shaped resonator with 
a chamfer, which generally exhibits chaotic behavior. An electron microscopy image of an 
example microcavity is shown in Figure 3.1 with 30-μm diameter. 
 
Figure 3.1: Scanning electron microscopy (SEM) image of an example PUF cavity [26]. 
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Random physical idiosyncrasies of the cavity such as film thickness, material 
impurities, surface roughness, artificially induced features, and the precise geometry shape 
enhance the device’s resilience against cloning and other adversarial attacks. Even with the 
complete knowledge of the design, these physical structures are impossible to replicate 
exactly, even for the original manufacturer, thus making the devices unique. In addition, at 
high optical power levels the non-linear behavior of silicon increases the complexity of the 
challenge-response relationship, thus providing necessary properties such as one – 
wayness, unclonability, and unpredictability. Robust optical coupling via add and drop 
single-mode waveguides facilitates the high repeatability of the device behavior. 
The certain shape and the geometry characteristics of the micro-cavity are the result 
of computational optimizations and finite difference time-domain simulations over 
diameter, chamfer orientation, and chamfer size. As a result of these optimizations, a 
general trade-off between the input-to-output loss and cavity lifetime was observed. 
Specifically, large cavity geometry results in a longer photon lifetime and increased optical 
losses, whereas the smaller diameters exhibit decreased optical loss and photon lifetime 
thus less complexity of input-to-output relationship but greater signal strength which 
improves repeatability. Given this trade-off, an optimal point was found and a device with 
30-μm diameter was selected as a baseline device. 
In [26, 67, 68] Grubel et al. provide an extensive work on silicon photonic PUFs 
beginning from the details of the ray chaotic design and fabrication processes of the cavity 
and finishing with the applications of photonic PUFs in an encrypted communications and 
system authentication. However, one of the future steps indicated in the previous work is 
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the evaluation of unpredictability through measuring resistance to emerging machine 
learning attacks. The analysis of such attacks is the subject of this dissertation. Therefore, 
in this chapter, I provide an overview of the previous work that is the most relevant to 
adversarial attacks on silicon photonic PUFs. In particular, I will describe the nonlinear 
properties of the photonic PUF that increase the complexity of the optical interactions 
within the cavity thereby enhancing its security (section 3.2). These properties, as we will 
see later in Chapter 5, play a crucial role in the performance of modeling attacks on silicon 
photonic PUFs.  Further, Grubel et al. investigate photonic PUF as an authentication token 
in a challenge-response protocol with thorough description of the challenge and response 
signals, their generation procedures and further post-processing algorithms (section 3.3). 
Lastly, the physical unclonability of silicon photonic PUF is proven with the set of FHD 
distributions for the set of physical clones of the device, leaving the mathematical 
unclonability or vulnerability to ML attacks as an open question. It is important to recall 
that PUF is truly unclonable if it is both mathematically and physically unclonable. 
  
3.2 Nonlinear Properties 
In this section, I give a very brief background on the nonlinear optics and cover a 
few of the nonlinear processes that are relevant to silicon photonic PUF operation. 
3.2.1 Nonlinear optics 
The first strides towards the studying the nonlinear optical processes are dated back 
to 1870 when John Kerr discovered the change in the refractive index of solids and liquids 
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under the strong external DC field [77]. This now well-known phenomenon is called Kerr 
effect. Further substantial progress in this direction was made with the advent of intense 
light sources, i.e. lasers, in 1960 and since then nonlinear optics continues as an active field 
of research with innumerable applications.  
For many years until the Kerr effect was discovered it was considered that optical 
materials respond linearly to an applied external electric field. In linear conditions, beams 
of light do not interact (superposition principle). However, later it was realized that this 
assumed linear response is valid only at small field strengths. From a theoretical point of 
view, the linearity of the medium’s response can be described by the relationship between 
the induced polarization density field and the electric field 
?⃗? (𝑡) = 𝜀0 𝜒
(1)?⃗? (𝑡), 
where 𝜀0 is the permittivity of free space and 𝜒
(1) is known as the linear susceptibility. In 
nonlinear optics this relationship is generalized by presenting the polarization field as a 
power series of electric field strengths 
?⃗? (𝑡) = 𝜀0 [𝜒
(1)?⃗? (𝑡)  +  𝜒(2)?⃗? 2(𝑡)  +  𝜒(3)?⃗? 3(𝑡) + . . . ] 
The terms 𝜒(2)  and 𝜒(3)  are the second- and the third-order nonlinear optical 
susceptibilities and the terms proportional to ?⃗? 2(𝑡) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 ?⃗? 3(𝑡) represent the second- and 
third-order nonlinear polarization effects, respectively. For simplicity, I take optical 
susceptibilities as constants whereas in the general case they depend on the frequencies of 
the external field. In the simple case (and ignoring the vector direction), the external electric 
field 𝐸(𝑡) = 𝐴 𝑐𝑜𝑠 (𝑤𝑡) creates a dipole moment p per atom aligned with the applied field, 
or P = Np, where N is the atomic number density. Therefore, the polarization field up to 
second order is aligned with the applied field and its magnitude is given by, 
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𝑃(𝑡) = 𝜀0 [𝜒
(1)𝐴 𝑐𝑜𝑠 (𝑤𝑡)  + 
1
2
𝜒(2)𝐴2(1 +  𝑐𝑜𝑠(2𝑤𝑡))]. 
The second order term of polarization consists of a contribution at zero frequency ~ 𝜒(2)𝐴2 
and a contribution at the frequency of 2𝑤. The latter leads to the generation of the second 
harmonic radiation which was observed experimentally by a team led by Peter Franken 
[78]. In his experiment, a slab of crystalline quartz was illuminated by a ruby laser with 
intense radiation and λ = 694.3 nm resulting in a detectable second harmonic radiation at λ 
= 347.15 nm.  
Such nonlinear optical effects are the root of a range of fundamental physical 
mechanisms at the atomic and molecular level of the material. The classical approach of 
treating optical nonlinearities is based on the extended Lorentz model of the atom with 
additional quadratic displacement terms under the external force [79, 80]. The main 
shortcoming of this model is that this approach is based on the single resonance frequency 
of the atom. In addition, it is not suitable for the external fields with the frequencies much 
lower than the resonance frequency of the material system. Therefore, the quantum 
mechanical theory of nonlinear susceptibility was developed to describe the atom with 
many energy eigenvalues, hence with many frequencies [79, 80]. According to this theory, 
the underlying origin of the nonlinearity is hidden inside 𝜒(𝑛)  coefficients that are 
calculated with the time-dependent perturbation theory. Moreover, the values of these 
coefficients are directly related to the symmetry properties of the material. The 
consequence is that 𝜒(2)  is non-zero only for materials that are non-centrosymmetric, 
whereas 𝜒(3) is non-zero for all media including those with 𝜒(2) = 0. Therefore, second 
harmonic generation (SHG), for example, is prohibited in gases, amorphous materials, and 
centrosymmetric crystalline materials (e.g. diamond lattice) etc. The third order term 
49  
𝜒(3)?⃗? 3(𝑡) gives rise to a variety of phenomena including third harmonic generation (THG), 
the Kerr effect, four-wave mixing (FWM), self-phase modulation (SPM), and two-photon 
absorption (TPA). Due to the vastness of nonlinear optical effects and theory, in the 
remainder of this sections I will cover only those effects that are relevant to the silicon 
photonic PUF.  
 The four-wave mixing (FWM) process, as it is demonstrated later in the silicon 
cavity, is one of the third-order nonlinear processes based on the mutual interaction 
between two or three lightwaves to produce light at new wavelengths. The basic idea of 
this phenomenon consists in the response of the medium to the propagation of two strong 
waves of angular frequencies w1, w2 that are typically referred to as pumps. As a result, two 
new frequencies are produced w3 = 2 w1 - w2 and w4 = 2 w2 – w1. When the process is 
seeded by either of the new frequencies this seed frequency is called the signal and the 
unseeded frequency is called the idler. This case of four different frequency components 
interacting with each other is called non-degenerate FWM. However, there is more 
commonly a case of pump-degenerate FWM where the two pump lightwaves are at the 
same frequency. For example, a single pump can provide the amplification for signal and 
idler components. In the next section, FWM along with other nonlinear processes were 
experimentally observed in the silicon resonator by observing the output spectrum and 
identifying the new frequencies generated from two input laser pulses centered around two 
different wavelengths. 
 Another third-order effect is caused by the variation of the refractive index at high 
intensities of the external fields. It is shown that: 
∆𝑛 ≈  (
3𝜒(3)
4𝑐𝜀0 𝑛2
) 𝐼 =  𝑛2 𝐼, 
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n(I) = n + n2 I, 
where  𝐼 is the intensity of the field. This effect is known as the optical Kerr effect. The 
order of the magnitudes for coefficient 𝑛2 is 10
-16 in glasses to 10-2 in semiconductors. As 
a result of the optical Kerr effect, a strong lightwave experiences a self-induced phase shift 
known as self-phase modulation (SPM) during propagation in the medium. The phase shift 
due to the change in the refractive index can be calculated as follows:  





Generally, the nonlinear phase shift caused by SPM is rapidly time-varying due to the rapid 
fluctuations in optical intensity typical of optical pulses. This time-varying phase shift 
results in the frequency shift of the lightwave and thus a change of the optical spectrum. 
Specifically, it often leads to a spectral broadening of the pulse. As it is experimentally 
demonstrated in the next section, strong SPM effects also lead to the spectral distortion of 
the signal at very high input powers. Self-phase modulation (SPM) plays a central role in 
laser pulse propagation in a nonlinear medium and a notable result is the formation of a 
stable type of optical pulses so-called solitons in suitably dispersive media. 
 Nonlinear processes are generally avoided in conventional optical systems (e.g. 
fiber optic communications) due to various distortions of the signal and resultant impaired 
performance of the system. However, I demonstrate that nonlinearity is a highly beneficial 
property for enhancing the security of photonic PUFs, through enhancing both their 
unpredictability and unclonability. 
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3.2.1 Nonlinear processes in the silicon cavity 
Silicon material is well-known to exhibit a centrosymmetric property, thus third-
order optical nonlinear effects are most relevant and, in this section, the presence of these 
phenomena is demonstrated.  
There are several sources of nonlinearity in silicon devices: self-phase modulation 
(SPM), two-photon absorption (TPA), four-wave mixing (FWM), stimulated Raman 
scattering (SRS), etc. Each process is individually well understood and mathematically 
described, but most optical systems permit nonlinear effects in a collective manner. 
Generally, systems dealing with ultrashort pulses in nonlinear and dispersive media are 
described by the nonlinear Schrӧdinger equation (NLSE), due to the similarity of 
Schrӧdinger equation with a nonlinear potential term [79, 80]. The evolution of the pulse’s 










 −  𝑖𝛾|𝐴(𝑡, 𝑧)|2𝐴(𝑡, 𝑧) 
where 𝛽2 – second-order chromatic dispersion and 𝛾 – the coefficient corresponding to 
Kerr nonlinearity. The NLSE above is in the simplest form since it doesn’t reflect high-
order dispersion and the other third-order nonlinear processes such as TPA, Raman 
Scattering, and linear loss of the pulse. NLSE is difficult to solve analytically in practice. 
Therefore, the NLSE is typically solved numerically with several well-known methods 
including split-step Fourier analysis [71]. We use this method for simulation of models of 
the photonic PUF in a presence of SPM and chromatic dispersion in the cavity (Chapter 5).  
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As already mentioned, nonlinearity is observed at very high light intensities or 
electric fields, so to demonstrate the presence of nonlinearity behavior of photonic cavity 
the output spectrum as a function of input power level is first examined on an optical 
spectrum analyzer (OSA). In particular, one of the spectral response to a certain challenge 
pulse is observed at three different input pulse energies. The combination of SPM, FWM, 
and TPA results in the distinct variations of the spectrum profile indicating that the 
photonic PUF is functioning in a nonlinear regime. In addition, FWM is demonstrated in 
one of the PUF device by inputting two 6.7 ps pulses at different wavelengths (Figure 3.2).  
 
Figure 3.2: Nonlinear processes in silicon photonic PUF. a) Variations of spectral density 
in a response at different input laser pulse energies. b) Demonstration of FWM effect in a 
cavity by inputting two 6.7 ps pulses centered at υ1 = 191.94 THz and υ2 = 192.43 THz. 
Observed sidebands are centered at υ3 = 191.57 THz and υ4 = 192.80 THz. c) Spectral 
response of the cavity and two probe measurements. d) Temporal response of the two 
probes demonstrating the showing free-carrier dispersion effects. 
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By pump-probe measurement the presence of free-carrier dispersion (FCD) and 
free-carrier absorption was experimentally observed [83]. The pump of 3.5ps 300-pJ laser 
pulse from 90MHz mode-locked laser sent through a bandpass filter, whereas the probe is 
a continuous wave source. During the pulse propagation in the cavity, free-carriers are 
generated which introduce the absorption and the shift in the cavity’s resonance. This can 
be observed by placing the probe at two locations of the transmission spectrum of the cavity 
and detecting the inverted temporal response. From the Figure 3.6d, the free-carrier 
lifetime can be determined to be approximately 1.9ns. 
Spectral distortion of the signal, generation of new frequencies, the generation of 
free carriers and their impact on the semiconductor loss and refractive index all contribute 
to an extremely complex and unpredictable output response. Thus, nonlinearity is playing 
a critical role in constructing reliable photonic PUF. 
 
3.3 Challenge – Response Authentication 
Any strong PUF proposal is typically used in a system authentication. In [67] a 
silicon photonic PUF is exploited as an authentication token in a challenge-response 
authentication protocol. The sequence of spectrally-encoded ultrashort optical pulses 
constitutes a challenge signal whereas the post-processed optical output from the cavity is 
considered a response. The experimental setup for the authentication scheme is presented 
in Figure 3.3. 
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Figure 3.3: An experimental setup for testing an authentication protocol. a) An 
authentication protocol where the measured response is compared to expected response 
from CRP library associated with certain PUF token. b) Using Mach-Zender Modulator 
(MZM) a sequence of ultrafast pulses sourced from mode-locked laser (MLL) are encoded 
with binary sequences from a pulse pattern generator (PPG). After a series of compression 
and amplification of pulses they are sent to photonic cavity and the measured analog 
response is detected with photodetector (PD) [67]. 
 
The generation of challenge pulses is implemented in the following way. 300-fs 
mode-locked laser (MLL) pulses are stretched to 11 ns by dispersion compensating fiber 
(DCF) and the temporally broadened spectrum is modulated with a length of 128 
pseudorandom binary sequence (PRBS) that is generated with pulse pattern generator 
(PPG). After encoding the optical pulses are compressed to 6-ps duration using the standard 
single mode fiber, amplified with an EDFA to a certain power level and sent to photonic 
PUF device. The amplification of light can be controlled on the EDFA and depending on 
the power level, the PUF functions in a varyingly nonlinear regime. For this experiment, 
the total number of unique challenge pulses generated during the enrollment of PUF is 
8550. Each challenge pulse sent to the PUF results in analog response sequence that is 
further converted to digital power samples using an analog-to-digital converter (ADC).  
For the sake of PUF quality evaluations, it is typically more convenient to operate 
with challenges and responses in binary form. Therefore, to extract a binary representation 
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of each response, a post-processing algorithm is applied to the digital power samples 
obtained in the experiment (Figure 3.3). The post-processing procedure is algorithmic in 
its nature and has no relation to the hardware operation. To derive the binary sequence from 
power samples, the probability density function (PDF) is estimated for response energies 
and an equalization procedure is implemented such that the probability of choosing any 
power value becomes equal. Using a Gray code conversion each power sample is converted 
to binary with specified number of resampling bits. Then, an XOR operation is performed 
on adjacent binary sequences.  In the end, the results of XOR operation are appended 
together to create a single bit sequence that constitutes to a binary response. The total length 
of binary sequence per response depends on a number of resampling bits and the number 
of least significant bits (LSB) kept per sample. 
As for authentication itself, the authenticator selects randomly a specific CRP from 
CRL, encodes the binary challenge via spectral patterning described above, sends the 
encoded optical pulse to PUF device and measures the post-processed analog response. 
The acquired response is compared to the expected response from CRL calculated during 
the enrollment process. The comparison is based on the FHD calculation. If two responses 
match up to a certain threshold value, the authentication is successful. The threshold for 




Figure 3.4: Post-processing algorithm for binary sequence derivation from analog 
response [67]. 
 
3.4 Experimental Results 
3.4.1 Physical Unclonability 
To investigate the silicon PUF’s unclonability and repeatability properties, six 
prototypes were fabricated. For each design a CRL is built by averaging 460 analog 
response corresponding to the same challenge sequence. This CRL was utilized during the 
FHD histogram calculation where an individual measured response is compared to the 
averaged response from CRL associated with the certain device. The resulted FHD 
distributions are plotted for six different cavities. The set of histograms on the left are 
“same” or “like” distributions whereas the histograms on the right are “different” or 
“unlike” distributions (Figure 3.4). The threshold for authentication error is determined by 
the distance between the “same” and “different” distributions. 
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Figure 3.5: Authentication results. a) FHD histograms for each cavity calculated against 
design 2 along with 2 additional FHD histograms corresponding to the clone of design 2 
and to the same design 48 hours later. b) Normalized FHD histograms for each design 
against every other cavity. Error bars represent ± standard deviations [67]. 
 
The total authentication error of the protocol is the sum of false acceptance rate 
(FAR) and false rejection rate (FRR) that is optimized under the variation of the number 
of bits kept at post-processing algorithm. It is shown that authentication error can be 
minimized to 10-21 of false accepting or false rejection for a key material length of 17.1 kb. 
The results in the Figure 3.4 indicate that the mean value and standard deviation of FHD 
values for the “same” distribution reflects the reproducibility of PUF to identical 
challenges. The width of “same” distribution comes from a variety of noise sources and 
environmental factors. In this case, the “same” distribution for design 2 is centered around 
0.1 meaning that the number of positions in response sequences differs by 10% of the total 
length on average. At the same time, “different” FHD distributions are centered around 0.5 
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indicating the degree of uniqueness of the device. Besides different cavity designs, the 
FHD distributions of the clone are calculated where the responses of design 2 were 
compared with CRL of identical design fabricated at the same conditions and at the same 
time. The distribution for the clone is located very close to “different” distribution 
indicating the high degree of distinguishability between the genuine device and the clone.  
Lastly, the repeatability of the system over time is estimated by plotting FHD values 
corresponding to design 2 at the certain time and subsequently plotting FHD values 
corresponding to the same device 48 hours later. As shown in Figure 3.4, there is a clear 
repeatability of PUF system with the small drift of the mean value that is accounted for the 
temperature variations in the laboratory room.  
Thus, the experimental results above directly demonstrated the reproducibility, 
uniqueness and physical unclonability properties of photonic PUFs making this approach 
highly desirable in system identification applications and other areas related to hardware 
security. 
 
3.4.2 Information Content Metrics 
Since the silicon photonic PUF is envisioned as a source of random private key 
material it is useful to estimate the information capacity of the device, i.e. the number of 
unique random bits of information that can be derived from a single PUF device. PUFs 
with high information content are harder to fully characterize by an adversary. Further, 
knowing the specifications related to information content allows one to answer critically 
important questions. For example, what is the maximum possible key length can be 
generated by photonic PUF? What is the maximum amount of information can be 
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encrypted or decrypted using photonic PUF? How fast is key material generation and how 
much information will an adversary need to gather in order to successfully break the 
device’s security? To answer these questions, experimental and theoretical investigations 
of information capacity of photonic PUFs are presented [69]. Specifically, the nonlinear 
properties of the silicon photonic PUF make a great impact on the security enhancement 
and susceptibility to modeling attacks. On top of that, the nonlinearity allows significant 
improvements in PUF’s information capacity. Finally, the key generation rate is estimated 
and because of the use of lightwave signals, it is shown to be around 200 Mbps 
outperforming the best optical scattering PUFs rates.  
To derive the information capacity limits for silicon photonic PUF, the spectro-
temporal information mapping model is utilized [26, 69] (Figure 3.6). The input laser pulse 
is composed of multiple encoded spectral features each of which with the spectral width 
∆fin and temporal width ∆tin. The total number of spectral features and time slots in the 
pulse are mf = Ω/∆fin and mf = τ/∆tin respectively, where Ω - is the spectral bandwidth of 
the light source and τ – is the cavity lifetime. The input feature sizes may be arbitrarily 
chosen and in order to maximize the number of possible symbols encoded in the input map, 
∆fin = 1/∆tin was chosen. Therefore, the total number of input symbols is mf mt = Ω τ. In 
case of a linear system, the mapping from input symbol s to output symbol r may be 
represented as mi x mj transmission matrix T. The maximum number of independent rows 
of this matrix is equal to its rank, thus the challenge space is linear in terms of the total 
number of symbols. To attack this linear system, it is enough to calculate the inverse matrix 
of T and derive the input given the output. In a nonlinear system, the transmission function 
is a combination of nonlinear equations, thus the inversion of T no longer exists.  
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Figure 3.6: Spectro-temporal input and output mapping model [69]. 
 
The calculation of the information capacity of silicon PUF is based on the product 
of the number of bits per spectral response β and the total number of uncorrelated spectral 
responses n per cavity: N ≤ βn. The total number of possible spectral patterns is bound to 
the spectral width of the source and the cavity lifetime. Specifically, the total number of 
input symbols with binary modulation yields n = 2Ωτ. In the original experiment, the 
spectral width of the 300-fs laser pulse 4.2THz and the average feature size ∆fin = 44.2 
GHz were measured. Hence, the upper bound of the independent number of responses is 
given by n = 2
𝛺
∆𝑓𝑖𝑛 = 294. The number of bits per response β can be estimated via calculation 
entropy rate of the spectral output of the device. In [69] the spectral probability mass 
function is determined from the spectral responses of the device and the number of bits per 
spectral feature is estimated to 5.2 for one of the polarization states. Thus, β = 5.2 * Ω/∆fin 
= 286 bits leading to the upper bound of the total number of nits per device N ≤ βn ≤ 
1022Gbits. Given the area of the cavity 707 µm2 this yields to the information density of 
1022 Tbits/mm2 that is much greater than any information density of current digital storage 
devices. 
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For clarity, I present the comparison of silicon PUF against various OSPUF designs 
in key characteristics such as information generation rate, information content and 
information density are presented in the table below: 
 
 
Table 3.1: PUF performance metrics comparison [69]. 
 
3.4.3 Security Evaluation 
A photonic PUF’s susceptibility to an adversarial attack is a result of the chaotic 
behavior of the cavity, nonlinearity, physical limits, information density, and ultrafast 
operation speed. As it was shown before, the structure of the cavity with induced nano-
scale features and complex nonlinear optical interactions prevents direct cloning of the 
device. But besides physical duplication, there is another factor prohibiting cloning 
photonic PUF: the ultrafast response of the cavity (~20 ps). Let me assume that an 
adversary may attempt to construct CRP library associated with legitimate photonic PUF 
device. To be able to do that, an adversary has to build the setup with required optical 
equipment with necessary components and store the collected CRP values in a non-volatile 
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computer memory that subsequently would be used to provide the correct responses to the 
client for a given challenge. For the successful attack, the whole system would need to 
respond to the user faster than 20 ps. In other words, the whole time of looking up the 
correct response for a certain challenge should take less than the ultrafast response of the 
physical cavity. Any current memory technologies and CPUs are incapable of performing 
these extremely fast search algorithms, thus making this attack infeasible and completely 
unforeseeable in near future [70].  
 
3.5 Summary 
The original work described above was developed by Grubel et al. [67, 68, 69] and 
here I review the main properties that are the most relevant to the rest of this dissertation. 
In this chapter, silicon photonic PUF is introduced with its key properties and 
characteristics as well as application in an authentication protocol. Reproducibility, 
uniqueness, unclonability, and low authentication error of the device are directly 
demonstrated. From the information capacity perspective, it is demonstrated that photonic 
PUF outperforms previous optical PUF implementations in many key parameters such as 
information content, information density, and speed of private key generation. From the 
security perspective photonic PUFs are proven to be robust and resistant to adversarial 
attacks such as direct physical duplication and CRL optoelectronic characterization of the 
device. All these benefits with the compactness of the device, easy integration with 
electronic circuits and design simplicity make photonic PUFs extremely attractive in a 
range of technologies including smart tokens, secure data storage devices, and smart 
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authentication systems. Despite comprehensive works on photonic PUFs, there is one 
important question that remains unanswered. Specifically, unclonability means that the 
PUF must be both physically and mathematically unclonable, where the latter implies the 
infeasibility of any computational algorithm to emulate PUF’s behavior. In the original 
work, computational means of cloning were not investigated. Therefore, the next two 
chapters are focused on measuring the resistance to machine learning attacks and proving 























Chapter 4 : Deep Learning Attacks on 
Simulation Models of Silicon PUF 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The main focus of this and the next chapter is the study of the resistance of silicon 
photonic PUFs to machine learning attacks. For better understanding of the cavity 
operation I design a set of computational models, where I provide attempts to learn the 
propagation of optical challenge pulses in a simulated photonic PUF. Specifically, I start 
with the simplest model of deriving the analog power values via random spectral filtering 
of the binary challenges and applying the same post-processing algorithm to produce the 
binary responses. Then I proceed to create more sophisticated simulation models taking 
into account the nonlinear optical interactions and other features specific to the silicon PUF 
device. Every simulation model produces the set of analog power sequences that is 
eventually post-processed for binary response extraction. As a result, I obtain an artificially 
generated CRP database with binary challenges uniquely mapped to binary responses. To 
emulate the CRP behavior, I aim to design a set of machine learning attacks against all the 
simulated models of the photonic PUF.  
Machine learning tasks are typically classified into two broad types: supervised 
learning and unsupervised learning. The former type is referred to the family of algorithms 
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with the goal of mapping input to the corresponding outputs (labels), whereas in the latter 
the learning process is based on data with no labels.  Since the supervised learning approach 
fits our problem, I choose a Deep Neural Networks (DNN) model that is acknowledged to 
be the most powerful algorithm, outperforming all the previous conventional methods in 
ML area [73]. In every simulation model, I generate a set of 80,000 challenge-response 
pairs, 70% of which is used for training process of DNN and the rest is used for evaluating 
the performance of trained neural network. Each binary challenge and binary response 
consist of 128 and 186 bits respectively since each of 31 channels in the post-processing 
algorithm is digitized to 6 bits. The attack is successful if DNN model predicts the binary 
response to a given challenge with sufficiently high accuracy. I present the prediction 
accuracies for every simulation model and study the convergence of prediction curves with 
respect to the size of the training subset that is fed to the DNN model. Further, I investigate 
the performance of DNN attacks with respect to the number of resampling bits kept per 
channel during the post-processing procedure. Variation of the number of LSBs yields 
different lengths of binary responses and affects the final performance of ML attacks as 
well as the repeatability of the PUF system. Therefore, it is important to study the 
performance of the DNN across the bit number in the channel. 
 
4.2 Simulation models 
4.2.1 Linear Spectral Filter PUF 
We start with the trivial simulation model of a linear spectral filter that I call Linear 
Spectral Filter PUF. Specifically, we generate 80,000 128-bit spectrally encoded random 
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challenges and a filter of size 128 with uniformly distributed random numbers in the 
interval (0,1). Each challenge is multiplied in the spectral domain by the filter in an 
element-wise manner and integrated across the spectrum to obtain the analog power 
samples. These power samples are fed to post-processing algorithm to extract the binary 
response sequences. After collecting all 80,000 challenge-response pairs, the attacking 
procedure by DNN is performed. Due to the extremely simplicity of the given approach, 
we expect it to be the easiest task for DNN to correctly map the challenges to responses 
 
4.2.2 Nonlinear PUF with a Single Spatial Mode 
A more realistic model of the light propagation in the cavity includes a range of 
optical effects such as chromatic dispersion and self-phase modulation (SPM). In this 
model I assume that the optical pulse propagates non-resonantly as single spatial mode, 
thus there are no optical interactions between multiple modes that could potentially 
enhance the security of the device. Similar to the previous model, I create 80,000 128-bit 
challenge sequences each of which I encode onto 5-THz bandwidth optical pulse where 
each bit occupies 25 GHz of spectrum. To simulate the propagation of the optical signal in 
a presence of nonlinear effects and dispersion, I exploit the well-known split-step Fourier 
method [71]. This method is extensively used as a numerical approach to solve the pulse 
propagation problem in a nonlinear dispersive medium. The core idea of the split-step 
Fourier technique is straightforward. To model the nonlinearity effects and chromatic 
dispersion the medium is typically divided into a large number of segments, where at each 
segment the nonlinear and dispersion terms are applied in time and frequency domain 
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respectively. For example, the propagation of laser pulse with amplitude E(t, z) in optical 
fiber is dictated by nonlinear Schrӧdinger equation:  
𝜕𝐸
𝜕𝑧





 +  𝑖𝛾|𝐸|2𝐸 
We dropped the term corresponding to the loss and high order nonlinear effects for 





 governs the effect of dispersion, whereas 
𝑖𝛾|𝐸|2𝐸 is responsible for Kerr nonlinearity. According to the split-step Fourier method, 
the equation can be split into linear part: 
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and nonlinear part: 
𝜕𝐸𝑁
𝜕𝑧
 =  𝑖𝛾|𝐸|2𝐸 =  ?̂? 𝐸 
Both parts have analytical solutions separately, but the NLSE does not have a general 
analytical solution. However, if the propagation path is divided into many small segments, 
then the two parts can be treated separately with a minor numerical error. Typically, the 
dispersion step has an analytical solution in the frequency domain, so it is convenient to 
Fourier transform the signal and convert it back to the time domain where the nonlinear 
step can be applied. 
In the case of the silicon cavity, I model every segment to be one roundtrip 
propagation distance. At the first half of this distance the pulse accumulates a certain 
nonlinear phase shift in time domain, whereas at the second half the dispersion effect is 
applied in the frequency domain. We specify cavity’s material parameters such as group 
velocity dispersion β = -21.7 fs2/mm and nonlinear parameter γ = 103 W-1m-1 that is 
typically used for nonlinear phase shift calculation. The amount of nonlinearity in the 
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cavity is controlled via the peak amplitude of the input laser pulse. Since the cavity has an 
inherent loss and the coupling waveguides tangent to the disk, I incorporate these effects 
as well. After each round of propagation, the spectral and temporal profile of the pulse are 
detected. The sequence of power values is obtained by calculating the intensity profile of 
the output signal after 100 roundtrips. Power samples corresponding to a given challenge 
pulse are post-processed and stored in a CRP table for the subsequent attacking process. 
 
4.2.3 Nonlinear PUF with Multiple Spatial Modes 
The last modification made to the developed simulation model is the excitement of 
multiple spatial modes of the cavity. Here, I set 100 modes propagating in the silicon 
resonator each of which has its own optical loss, roundtrip time and coupling ratio of the 
power. By introducing 100 spatial modes I allow the complex intermodal optical 
interactions in the cavity. I expect that a modeling attack against this simulation would 
yield the worst performance due to the greater complexity of the nonlinear interactions 
between modes. 
4.3 Results 
In this section, I present the results of attacking simulated photonic PUF via Deep 
Neural Networks. The implementation details of DNN and all parameters associated with 
the design of the network are given in section 5.4.  
 By performing DNN attacks against the aforementioned simulation models of the 
PUF I address two important questions. First, is DNN capable of emulating every 
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simulation model? Second, what is the minimum number of CRPs the attacker needs in 
order to successfully break the simulated PUF? To answer the first question, it is enough 
to train DNN on 70% of the total 80,000 CRPs and evaluate the prediction results on the 
rest 30% of the CRP library. To answer the second question, I run DNN for different sizes 
of CRP database and identify the least number of samples at which DNN gives the lowest 
prediction error. In Figure 4.1 results of DNN attacks are presented.  
 
Figure 4.1: DNN attack on simulated photonic PUF. Prediction results are obtained on 
30% of CRPs (test set) after training process on 70% of CRPs (train set). Linear (blue), 
nonlinear PUF with dispersion and single spatial mode (orange) and nonlinear PUF with 
multiple spatial modes at three different input energy pulses (green, red, purple) are 
presented. For a comparison, performance of DNN on experimental dataset is also 
demonstrated (brown). Purple curve represents the accuracy of random guessing of every 
response generated by TRNG. 
 
Surprisingly, we do not observe any differences in the performance of DNN across 
all simulation models. Even the most complex model of the cavity with 100 spatial modes 
and with the highest dominance of SPM effect (∆φNL = 10π) is attacked by DNN yielding 
the same prediction accuracy of ~86%. For benchmark comparison we run the DNN on 
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two additional CRP datasets. I plot the prediction curves corresponding to experimental 
dataset of 80,000 CRPs collected in the original work. This dataset was gathered at a 
relatively low energy of the input pulse with minimum nonlinear effects. As it can be seen, 
the prediction accuracy of DNN, in this case, is ~60%. In addition, we create 80,000 
challenges where each challenge is associated with random binary sequence generated by 
a true random number generator (TRNG). In Figure 4.1, it was confirmed that the DNN is 
incapable of learning anything from this dataset. In other words, DNN is equivalent to 
random guessing of correct binary responses where the prediction rate is 50%. Hence, we 
answered the first question regarding the ability of the ML algorithm to emulate the 
simulated PUF behavior.  
An additional observation we make from the prediction results is the dependence 
of DNN’s performance on the size of CRP database. Interestingly, starting from 40,000 
CRPs the prediction accuracy of DNN hits a plateau with insignificant fluctuations. This 
answers the second question regarding the minimum number of samples the attacker needs 
for the successful design of the ML model. In a real scenario Figure 4.1 indicates that if 
an Eve steals 70% of the 40,000 samples to train the Neural Network then this model would 
extrapolate PUF behavior on any new challenge-response pairs with 86% accuracy.  
Lastly, we study the prediction accuracies of DNN as a function of bit number that 
is kept during the post-processing of raw analog power samples. In all simulation models 
above, I keep 6 bits per channel leading to 186-bits responses and I assume that most 
significant bit (MSB) is the most repeatable and easy learnable bit representing the largest 
fluctuations in the power value, whereas the least significant bit (LSB) is the most sensitive 
and the hardest bit to learn for DNN. For this reason, I perform six DNN attacks against 
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80,000 CRPs, where the length of every response is 31 bits (one bit per channel). In every 
attack I keep only one bit starting from the MSB (bit number 1) and finishing with LSB 
(bit number 6) (Figure 4.2) 
 
Figure 4.2: DNN performance as a function of bit number kept in digitized channel. Bits 
are ordered from the most significant bits (MSB) to the least significant (LSB) ones. 
Notably, the average of prediction errors for 6 bits matches to the overall prediction error 
of DNN against CRP with 186 bits responses (86%) 
 
As expected, the worst prediction accuracy is shown for bit number 5 and 6, thus 
leading to the trade-off between the ML resistance and repeatability of PUF. Keeping only 
the most sensitive (and noisiest in the experiment) bits harms the reproducibility but 
enhances the security of the PUF. On the other hand, if I keep, for example, the first two 
bits in each channel, then PUF is more repeatable but at the cost of the higher vulnerability 
to modeling attacks. Given this trade-off, we choose 4 bits that I consider an optimal 




In this chapter, we designed various computer simulations of the PUF cavity that, I 
believe, is a natural step for the next modeling attacks against large experimental CRP 
dataset. In these models, we attempted to capture several significant complex nonlinear 
interactions and other details specific to the photonic cavity. However, on the security side, 
simulations demonstrated to be relatively weak against Deep Neural Networks. As shown, 
DNN easily characterizes the CRP relationship produced by all type of simulations with 
high accuracy (86%). In addition, the resistance to ML algorithms of PUF models can be 
managed via the converting power samples to binary representations in the post-processing 
algorithm. Specifically, it is shown that keeping a different number of bits in the digitized 
form of the response makes an impact on two important properties such as repeatability 
and mathematical unclonability. As the future step, it is important to extend simulation 
models by including other high order nonlinear effects such as TPA, Raman scattering, 
self-steepening.  
Given these results, I proceed to the next set of DNN attacks on the silicon photonic 











Chapter 5 : Deep Learning Attacks on 




The focus of this chapter is to provide a set of Machine Learning Attacks against a 
true experimental silicon photonic PUF, a recent approach based on ultrafast nonlinear 
optical interactions in silicon microcavity. I demonstrate that in practice nonlinear silicon 
PUFs are resistant to two possible ML attack scenarios. I find that this resistance is rooted 
in the optical nonlinearity of the silicon photonic PUF token in tandem with its complex 
ray chaotic structure. Finally, I investigate encrypted data storage and compare the results 
of decryption using genuine PUF device and ML “clone”. 
To quantify the degree of protection offered by a PUF, it is important to quantify 
the difficulty of determining the input, given the observed output. The security of a PUF 
rests on the inability to duplicate the physical device or to accurately model its behavior, 
so that only the device holder can extract the CRP database.  In recent years artificial 
intelligence and machine learning have made great strides in learning the behavior of a 
physical process or device via training, without the need for a physical model. If ML can 
learn the behavior of the device after exposure to a subset of the CRP database, then the 
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security of the PUF (as well as of the resource that it protects) is at risk, as the machine can 
then generate the entire CRP database at any time. Notably, ML attacks have been very 
successful against electronic strong PUFs, including Arbiter PUFs, Ring Oscillators, XOR 
Arbiter PUFs and other electronic-based cryptographic devices [37, 42, 72]. It is known 
that only optical scattering-based PUFs continue to resist ML attacks, e.g., the first non-
integrated optical PUF implemented by Pappu et al. has, as of this writing, not yet been 
successfully attacked by ML algorithms [29, 30, 42]. However, this resistance is trivially 
achieved in this bulk approach as a different spatial region of a random material is probed 
with each new challenge and thus there can be no way to learn the behavior based on 
previous observations. This is akin to having a large number of unique PUF devices and 
using each only once. However, this greater security comes at the cost of large device size, 
a lack of electronic integration, and extremely poor reproducibility of behavior. Notably, 
attempts to integrate scattering PUFs robustly into CMOS circuits have been shown 
vulnerable to modeling and ML attacks due to the reuse of the scattering volume and the 
linear nature of the scattering process [41, 42].  
Recently our research group demonstrated a novel photonic PUF that harnesses 
nonlinear optical behavior in an integrated silicon photonic device that maintains high 
compatibility with electronics [67, 68]. This silicon photonic PUF can be easily integrated 
with both CMOS electronics and telecommunications hardware in particular due to the 
recent emergence of silicon photonic chip foundries [69]. However, as with other PUF 
technologies, a remaining crucial factor is the device’s unpredictability and resistance to 
ML attacks, which is the focus of this chapter.  
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In this investigation, I construct ML-attacks against a silicon photonic PUF as 
follows. If an adversary Eve can obtain access to the photonic PUF or otherwise steal a 
subset of CRPs, I aim to determine whether Eve, within a limited time frame, can derive a 
mathematical model that can correctly emulate the full device behavior and thus generate 
the full challenge-response space by predicting unobserved CRPs (Figure 5.1). 
 
Figure 5.1: An adversary attack procedure. Having a subset of CRPs from the full 
challenge-response space, Eve has a limited time to design the machine learning algorithm 
in order to obtain the approximate behavior of a PUF device. Specifically, Eve trains a 
Deep Neural Network (DNN) on the stolen set of CRPs, feeds the DNN with new 
challenges and attempts to predict unobserved CRPs. If the DNN predicts the correct 
responses up to some error threshold, then PUF is considered to be compromised. 
 
 Previous successful attacks on electronic PUFs were conducted using Support 
Vector Machines (SVM), Boosting, Logistic Regression, and Evolution Strategies [37, 40, 
55]. Here, I present ML-based attacks against the silicon photonic PUF in both 
authentication and encryption scenarios using Deep Learning on a Deep Neural Network 
(DNN) and demonstrate the PUF’s high resistance to learning due to the complexity of its 
nonlinear optical behavior. In the ML community, Deep Learning is acknowledged as the 
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state-of-the-art technique and outperforms other solutions in multiple fields such as 
computer vision, image and speech recognition, classification and machine translation 
[73]. A major advantage of the Deep Learning framework is that it can model nonlinearity 
and can be easily adapted to new problems. For these reasons, I chose Deep Learning to 
investigate ML attacks against silicon photonic PUF. Notably, for completeness I also 
investigated other methods (e.g. SVM, Logistic Regression) and all performed inferiorly 
to a DNN and thus only the Deep Learning results are presented here.  
 
5.2 Results 
5.2.1 Data Collection 
I employ the methods described in [67] for token authentication and methods based 
on [69] for encryption. Ultrafast 300-fs laser pulses with 90-MHz repetition rate undergo 
frequency-to-time mapping in dispersion compensating fiber (DCF) and are encoded with 
128-bit random binary amplitude sequences generated by a pulse pattern generator at 11.52 
Gbit/s. These spectrally-encoded challenge pulses are compressed with complementary 
dispersion single-mode fiber (SMF) to near their transform-limited duration and coupled 
into the PUF. The sequence of response pulses emanating from the device is amplified, 
filtered with a set of spectral masks, and recorded with a photodiode (PD) and synchronized 
analog-to-digital converter (ADC) providing one 16-bit sample at the peak of each pulse. 
A post-processing algorithm derives the response binary sequence from the analog samples 
using probability equalization and resampling to a selectable number of significant bits per 
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sample. Each 128-bit random sequence serves as a single challenge; 32 output spectral 
filters, resampled to 4 bits with an XOR applied to successive spectral filter outputs, yields 
124 bits per response (31 channels of 4 bits). During the enrollment phase, I collect 
averaged responses to 960,000 challenges to create the CRP database for both the training 
and test datasets for the Deep Learning attacks. I performed the enrollment process three 
times at different optical power levels of the challenge pulses to study the effect of optical 
nonlinearity on the success of the ML-attack. Training and test data were generated 
according to a 60/20/20 partition: 60% of the data was used for training, 20% of the data 
was used for cross-validation and tuning hyperparameters of the neural nets, and the 
remaining 20% of the data was used as a test set to evaluate the ML performance to 
unobserved CRPs.  
 
5.2.2 Machine Learning Attacks Scenarios 
I investigate two possible ML attack scenarios based on the point at which an 
eavesdropper (Eve) manages to observe the output of the device (Figure 5.2a). First, Eve 
might attempt to emulate the device by observing the input and output binary sequences 
and training an ML algorithm to predict all of the CRPs in the database. I refer to this 
scenario as a direct attack (Figure 5.2b). Because the bit extraction algorithm does not 
attempt to add security beyond the device itself, I also consider the scenario in which an 
eavesdropper can probe the output waveguide and record unprocessed power samples 
directly. I refer to this as a side-channel attack (Figure 5.2c), where instead of predicting 
the binary responses, Eve attempts to model the analog optical power transfer of the device. 
I consider the side-channel attack to be the best possible chance to model the device.  
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Figure 5.2: Machine Learning Attacks scenarios. a) General setup of challenge–response 
generation with hardware setup producing analog power samples response and post-
processing algorithm producing the binary version of the response b) Direct attack with 
ML model mapping binary-to-binary relationship c) Side-channel attack with ML model 
mapping binary-to-real relationship. 
 
5.2.3 Direct Attack 
I first studied the convergence of the DNN to a stable prediction of the entire 124-
bit binary response to each challenge with increasing size of the total training dataset (i.e., 
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employing an increasing percentage of the total 960k to create the training, validation, and 
test data). In Figure 5.3a, three learning curves are presented for different input optical 
power levels. In all cases, I observe that the performance of the DNN plateaus after a 
training set size of roughly 105 and in all cases the DNN fails to accurately reproduce the 
behavior of the PUF.  Notably, the performance of the DNN shows a clear dependence on 
the amount of optical nonlinearity in the PUF. I observe that increasing the optical 





Figure 5.3: ML direct attack results. a) Convergence of NN generalization errors with 
respect to amount of the dataset at average pulse energy 0.36 pJ (blue), 0.72 pJ (yellow) 
and 1.7pJ (red) b) NN prediction error of each bit in channel at maximum number of 
samples used for training phase. c)Normalized FHD distributions and histograms 
calculated against CRP of legitimate PUF token at different power levels in the setup: 
“like” distribution (green) represents the FHD values between repetitions and the response 
sequence from CRP of the legitimate PUF, ML “clone” distribution (blue) represents the 
FHD values between ML predicted response sequences and the response from CRP of 
legitimate PUF. 
 
Notably, for a given challenge each response channel is digitized to 4 bits. With the 
most significant bit (MSB) representing the largest scale fluctuations and the least 
significant bit (LSB) representing the finest scale fluctuations. We expect the MSB (bit 
number 1) to be the easiest to learn and the LSB (bit number 4) to be the hardest to learn. 
For this reason, I also study the performance of the DNN as a function of bit number. As 
shown in Figure 5.3b, I find that lesser bits of each 4-bit channel are the most difficult to 
predict, as expected. Notably, the probability density function (PDF) of the analog power 
samples has an entropy of 6 bits [67], but during bit extraction I downsample to 4 bits by 
discarding the least significant levels to improve repeatability (limited by the signal to noise 
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ratio). Thus, the ML performance as a function of bit number should also be considered to 
determine the optimal trade-off between repeatability and ML-resistance.  
In the experiments, the authentication threshold is optimized based on the FHD 
distribution generated by repeated probing of the device and that generated by non-
authentic devices. In practice, there is no unique optimal threshold; the threshold is set to 
the value best suited to the user’s needs. In this context, the ML performance is relevant to 
determine an optimized threshold. Here, I computed the set of like histograms at different 
power levels in the experiment as well as a set of machine learning clone histograms, 
depicted in Figure 5.3c. Notably, I observe excellent separability between the genuine PUF 
device and the ML clone PUF using 9.9-kbit keys generated from concatenated responses. 
This occurs even at the lowest power level when the effects of optical nonlinearity are the 
weakest. However, at higher pulse energies the mean of the ML clone distribution moves 
closer to 0.5, consistent with the observation that the optical nonlinearity in the device 
enhances its unpredictability. Notably, the ML clone performs markedly better than the 
actual physical clones on the same chip, which typically exhibit an FHD mean > 0.45 [67], 
underscoring the importance of these ML-resistance studies.  
 
5.2.4 Side-channel Attack 
To investigate a side-channel attack, I assume that Eve has temporary access to the 
raw power measurements after challenges are presented to the cavity. Thus, I train a second 
DNN to minimize the mean squared error (MSE) between the genuine device and the ML 
predictions. A comparison (using MSE) of the analog signals generated by Neural 
Networks with power samples obtained during the experiment is presented in Figure 5.4a. 
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In addition, I apply the bit extraction process to the ML predicted power samples to obtain 
a set of binary responses to generate an ML clone histogram (Figure 5.4b). 
 
 
Figure 5.4: Side-channel attacks results. a) Normalized MSE distributions based on 
comparison between power repetitions and averaged power sample of PUF device(green) 
and comparison on averaged power samples of PUF device and ML predicted power 
samples (blue). Note that the scale in the last figure is different from the previous two.  b) 
Normalized FHD distributions of binary response sequences obtained after post-processing 
algorithm on analog power samples.  Both charts are presented at different power of optical 
signal in the system 
 
From Figure 5.4, it is evident that even in the case of a side-channel attack, when 
Eve has a chance to extract raw analog data without its digital post-processing it is still not 
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possible to emulate the device. The FHD analysis leads to nearly the same results as in case 
of direct attacks (Figure 5.4b) with distinct separability of “clone” device and legitimate 
one and increased ML-resistance at high optical power levels. 
 
5.2.5 Encryption Results 
The exponentially large challenge-response space permitted with strong PUFs 
becomes most interesting for cryptography schemes that require extremely large key 
lengths, such as one-time pad (OTP) encryption [41]. Notable, a genuine PUF will always 
have some bits that differ from the CRP database because of noise. Forward error 
correction and fuzzy extraction of the usable cryptographic key material has been 
successfully employed to eliminate errors for secure communication with PUFs [61, 69]. 
Statistically, the ML clone can correctly predict a portion of the response bits, so it is 
necessary to test OTP encryption using key material generated from fuzzy extraction with 
a genuine PUF and consequent decryption (by Eve) of the message with key material 
extracted from the ML “clone” PUF using the same fuzzy extractor. To investigate the 
encryption performance under such an ML attack at a range of error correction code rates, 
the fuzzy extractor is applied to the response bits from the PUF to produce blocks of reliable 
and strong key material to encrypt a message. The message is XORed with this encryption 
to form the ciphertext. In Figure 5.5, I decrypt the message using the subsequent output of 
the genuine PUF and the trained ML clone to compare the success of decryption at different 
code rates. The performance is quantified based on the bit-error rate (BER) of the decrypted 
message. In the low power case, for example, code rates < 0.1 yielded no errors for the 
19.1-Mbit message upon decryption with the legitimate device. By contrast, the ML 
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“clone” was unable to accurately reconstruct any of the original message (BER ~0.5) at all 
code rates. 
 
Figure 5.5: a) Original message used and corresponding decryption results for ML clone 
and genuine PUF. b) The mean BER for the message decryption using ML clone and 
legitimate PUF CRL responses at different average power levels in the system.  Inset 
pictures show the quality of decryption at various code rates. ML clone is unable to 
reconstruct the original image even at the lowest code rates. 
 
5.3 Neural Network Design 
For this study, the machine learning algorithm was designed using the open-source 
Keras library [74] with Theano backend [75], implemented in Python and CUDA. The 
input layer of the NN consists of 128 nodes corresponding to the 128-bit challenge 
sequence length. The total number of hidden layers was kept to 2, each of which consists 
of 500 nodes, and, depending on the attack scenario, the NN and its parameters were 
adjusted to be consistent with the output format of the data. In direct attacks, where the NN 
should learn how to derive binary responses given the input challenge, the output layer 
nodes used a “sigmoid” activation function that is typically used for classification problems 
and the hidden layer nodes used the ReLU function. In the side-channel attacks, the output 
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layer of the NN should give the analog or continuous pulse energy values. Therefore, a 
linear activation function was used. I tested different configuration of Neural Network 
designs and concluded that deeper and wider networks yield the same out-of-sample errors, 
although it is more time consuming to train them.  
It is well-known, that NNs possess a huge set of hyperparameters that need to be 
tuned at cross-validation phase to achieve the greatest accuracy. Using the 60/20/20 
splitting schema of the whole dataset, I tuned such parameters as batch size, weight decay 
of regularization techniques, learning rate of optimization process and its momentum. In 
addition, dropout regularization was utilized to reduce overfitting and improve the 
generalization error. The optimization method was also varied, but generally set to “Adam” 
[76] which is a popular technique in the state-of-the-art neural networks configurations.  
 
5.4 Conclusion 
In conclusion, I have demonstrated the strong resistance of silicon photonic PUFs 
to state-of-the-art machine learning attacks. Neither a direct attack, attempting to reproduce 
the PUF’s extracted binary response to binary input challenges, nor a side-channel attack, 
granted access to the raw optical output from the PUF, succeeds in replicating the behavior 
of a legitimate photonic PUF. The optical nonlinearity is clearly shown to have critical 
importance in the resistance to such machine learning attacks. The demonstrated 
combination of device robustness and machine learning resistance is superior to any PUF 





Chapter 6 : Deep Learning Attacks on 
Simulation Model of Optical Scattering 
Physical Unclonable Function 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The goal of this chapter is to study the security aspects of an optical scattering 
PUF (OSPUF). OSPUFs have been shown to exhibit the unprecedented level of security 
and the resistance to modeling attacks. The optical scattering system originally proposed 
by Pappu et al. was one of the first scattering PUFs [29] (Figure 1.10). In the original work, 
he presented a non-integrated PUF system that possesses a number of advantages including 
low cost of equipment piece, extremely high output complexity, great resistance to 
adversarial attacks such as modeling attacks as well as physical cloning. However, on the 
downside, the whole OSPUF setup requires many moveable components and high 
precision mechanisms for stable read out of the responses. Therefore, the implementation 
of Pappu’s setup is laborious, expensive, and error-prone, thus motivating the research goal 
of embedding optical PUFs into electronic chips.  
Despite many advantages of OSPUF, very few attempts have been made in 
integrating OSPUF with electronic microcircuits. For example, one of the first miniaturized 
version of Pappu’s setup uses expensive and slow piezo positioners [81]. Later Rühmair et 
al. presented the prototypes of integrated OSPUF where LCDs and phase locked arrays 
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were utilized as spatial light modulators (SLM) [42]. However, his approaches were 
studied more for security analysis but not for physical implementation.  
Even less activity has been observed in the attacking OSPUF systems. 
Surprisingly, no machine learning attacks have ever been reported on scattering PUFs 
despite the fact that a linear scattering medium is typically exploited in the setup.  Due to 
this fact, we decided to investigate the level of complexity of this problem by constructing 
an integrated PUF experimental system similar to [42]. After multiple attempts to attack 
the experimental OSPUF, all our efforts remained unsuccessful. To better understand why 
we study the security of a simplified optical scattering PUF in the simulation. We believe 
that breaking the security of the simulated scattering system can give us the useful insight 
about the underlying reasons why OSPUF’s remain robust to modeling attacks.  
 
6.2 Simulation Model 
In practice when coherent light (e.g. a laser beam) illuminates a rough surface a 
speckle image is formed because of multiple interference of a set of wavefronts. 
Mathematically, speckle generation is described as a random walk where each wave 
experiences the random phase during the scattering. If each wave is modeled as a vector 
with random angles (phases) then the length of a resultant vector is distributed from zero 
to the sum of individual wave vectors. From diffraction theory, each point on a scattering 
surface acts as a source of secondary spherical waves. The light at any point in scattered 
space is the sum of amplitudes of each ray resulting in the exponential distribution of 
intensity values.  
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Figure 6.1: Single surface scattering of the modulated plane wave using the random phase 
mask. 
 
Based on this, we model in Matlab a single surface scattering of a plane wave using 
a random spatial phase mask. The whole computation procedure of the speckle image 
consists of the following steps (Figure 6.1). First, we apply an “on-off” scheme to the plane 
wave to obtain the binary illumination pattern with sizes that can be varied further. This 
binary pattern plays a role of a challenge in the scattering PUF model. The challenge spatial 
field is then multiplied by the random spatial phase matrix in an element-wise manner. The 
random phase matrix consists of Gaussian distributed numbers with mean value equal to 
the width of the surface and possesses the same number of features as the challenge. 
Therefore, each wavefront’s propagation length is random leading to the random 
accumulation of phase. In the end, I apply the Fourier transform to the result of element-
wise multiplication in order to obtain the far-field spatial intensity resulting in the speckle 
image, which plays a role of a response of the OSPUF. The Fourier step is implemented 
based on the assumption that the detection of speckle images is observed at much longer 
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distances than the wavelength of the source, leading to the far-field diffraction. For the sake 
of clarity, I present a pseudocode of essential steps for speckle generation: 
 
 
Following the procedure above, we collect 100,000 challenge-response pairs for 
different sizes of binary patterns: 8x8, 16x16, 32x32, and 64x64 pixels. The example of 
binary challenge and the corresponding speckle image is shown below for the size 32x32 
(Figure 6.2). 
 
Figure 6.2: Example of 32x32 binary pattern and corresponding obtained speckle image 
via the procedure described above. Exponential distribution of intensity values of all 
100,000 speckle images plotted for sanity checks. 
 
S = 32; % size of binary pattern 
N = 10000; % number of CRPs 
for i = 1:N 
 % binary challenge matrix 
     challenge_matrix = randi([0,1,S); 
 
 % random phase mask with Gaussian random numbers 
 r_mask = randn(S); 
 
 field = challenge_matrix.*exp(2j*pi*r_mask); 
 FFT = fft2(field); 
 response = FFT.*conj(FFT); % real valued intensity 
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As it can be seen, the distribution of intensity values is exponential and in the next 
section, this fact is used for benchmark analysis of the ML attacks performance. After the 
CRP collection, I perform the set of machine learning attacks based on the deep neural 
network algorithm. Essentially, the goal of these attacks is to explore the capability of the 
attacker to break the simulation model of OSPUF in its simplest form without using a 
physical model. Similar to the attacking procedure on silicon photonic PUF, we are 
interested in the minimum amount of CRP information that can be revealed to the attacker 
to accurately predict the responses given the unseen challenges.  
 
6.3 Simulation Results 
In this section, I present the results of the DNN performance against all sets of 
100,000 CRPs. The specific details of DNN structure, tuned hyperparameters, and 
necessary infrastructure are given in the section 6.5.  
The set of 100,000 CRPs is divided into three subsets: training data (70%) for model 
learning, validation data (20%) for tuning the model’s hyperparameters and test data (10%) 
for model’s performance evaluation. Before the training process, we preprocess the speckle 
images by normalizing the intensity values to the global maximum of the value across all 
speckle images. Therefore, the pixel intensities of the processed speckle images range 
between 0 and 1. As a metric for comparison between the correct and predicted responses, 
we choose the root-mean-square error (RMSE) that is calculated as follows: 
𝑅𝑀𝑆𝐸 = √






where 𝑁 – is the total number of CRPs, 𝑌𝑖  – vector corresponding to the ground truth 
speckle image, ?̂?𝑖 – vector corresponding to the DNN predicted speckle image. The next 
set of figures (Figure 6.3 – 6.6) shows the results of DNN for each of the four of pattern 
sizes from 8x8 to 64x64 pixels. For comparison, we evaluate the DNN prediction accuracy 
against the accuracy of random guessing. For example, in 8x8 speckle pattern, for each of 
64 pixels we randomly draw samples from the exponential distribution obtained from all 
simulated 100,000 8x8 speckle images. Then, we calculate the RMSE between the ground 
truth speckle image and the speckle image generated by the sampling procedure. This 
RMSE corresponds to the accuracy of random guessing. This is repeated for all pattern 
sizes. 
 
Figure 6.3: DNN performance on the set of 100,000 8x8 binary patterns and corresponding 
8x8 normalized speckle images. a) Speckle image generated in simulation code. b) Speckle 
image predicted by DNN c) Difference map between true and prediction speckles. d) 
RMSE distributions for DNN (centered around 0.004) and for random guessing algorithm 
(centered around 0.09). 
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Figure 6.4: DNN performance on the set of 100,000 16x16 binary patterns and 
corresponding 16x16 normalized speckle images. a) Speckle image generated in simulation 
code. b) Speckle image predicted by DNN c) Difference map between true and prediction 
speckles. d) RMSE distributions for DNN (centered around 0.01) and for random guessing 




Figure 6.5: DNN performance on the set of 100,000 32x32 binary patterns and 
corresponding 32x32 normalized speckle images. a) Speckle image generated in simulation 
code. b) Speckle image predicted by DNN c) Difference map between true and prediction 
speckles. d) RMSE distributions for DNN (centered around 0.026) and for random 




Figure 6.6: DNN performance on the set of 100,000 64x64 binary patterns and 
corresponding 64x64 normalized speckle images. a) Speckle image generated in simulation 
code. b) Speckle image predicted by DNN c) Difference map between true and prediction 
speckles. d) RMSE distributions for DNN (centered around 0.033) and for random 
guessing algorithm (centered around 0.084). 
 
At 8x8 CRPs the DNN’s prediction accuracy is ~20 times better than random 
guessing, whereas at 64x64 DNN’s prediction is only ~2.5 times better than random 
guessing. As expected, with the increase of pattern size and thus system complexity the 
DNN’s performance is deteriorated. The mean of RMSE distribution shifts from 4e-3 to 
3.3e-2 at 8x8 and 64x64 pattern sizes respectively. In addition, the width of RMSE 
distribution is increasing meaning that at large pattern sizes the DNN’s performance is 
noisier, so the reliability of the DNN model becomes worse.  
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Lastly, we studied the performance of neural networks against the training size of CRPs 
available to the attacker across all the pattern sizes. The results of this study would give 
the minimum number of CRPs the attacker should steal in order to train the DNN properly. 
 
Figure 6.7: DNN root mean squared error on test data for all pattern sizes and random 
guessing prediction. 
 
In Figure 6.7 four learning curves are presented along with the performance curve 
corresponding to random guessing. On the x-axis I measured the total size of the database, 
70% of which is used for training DNN. Notably, Figure 6.7 shows the clear dependence 
of the prediction accuracy on the input size pattern. In cases for 8x8 and 16x16 patterns, I 
observe that the performance of the DNN plateaus after a total size of CRPs 40,000, 
whereas for 32x32 it plateaus after 20,000 CRPs. Hence, for 32x32 patterns an acquirement 
of 20,000-30,000 CRPs would allow the fraud to achieve relatively high prediction 
accuracy at the same level as at 100,000 CRPs. In other words, if an eavesdropper steals 
95  
70% of the total minimum CRP size which is 14,000-21,000 CRPs, he/she can use this 
subset to train DNN and emulate the whole behavior of simulated OSPUF. Further, the 
absence of the significant drop of prediction error at 64x64 case indicates that it is not clear 
how much of the CRP data required for breaking the simulated OSPUF. 
 
6.4 Neural Networks Architectures 
We find that the optimal configuration of the Neural Networks (NN) is highly 
dependent on the size of the input data, i.e. pattern size. For all NNs, we use Keras library 
with Theano/Tensorflow backend for the GPU-accelerated training of neural network [74, 
75, 82]. The computer we use for training is running under Linux-Ubuntu 16.04 operating 
system with Nvidia GTX 1080 possessing 2560 CUDA cores and 8GB memory GDDR5X. 
For the 8x8 pattern size, the best performing NN consists of one input layer with 
64 neurons matching the input pattern size, 2 hidden layers with 64 and 4096 neurons each 
of them followed by ReLU activation layer. Since the speckle images are normalized and 
ranged between 0 and 1, the output layer consists of 64 neurons followed by the sigmoid 
activation layer. We train this NN for 2,000 epochs with batch size 256 and learning rate 
of 1e-3 using Adam optimization algorithm. The total number of trainable parameters is 
~530,000 with the total training time of 10 minutes.  
For the 16x16 pattern size, the best performing NN consists of one input layer with 
256 neurons matching the input pattern size, 2 hidden layers with 256 and 10,000 neurons 
each of them followed by ReLU activation layer. Since the speckle images are normalized 
and ranged between 0 and 1, the output layer consists of 256 neurons followed by the 
sigmoid activation layer. We train this NN for 2,000 epochs with batch size 64 and learning 
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rate of 1e-3 using Adam optimization algorithm. The total number of trainable parameters 
is ~5M with total training time ~1.5 hour. 
For the 32x32 pattern size, the best performing NN consists of one input layer with 
1024 neurons matching the input pattern size, 2 hidden layers with 1024 and 8192 neurons 
respectively each of them followed by ReLU activation layer. Since the speckle images are 
normalized and ranged between 0 and 1, the output layer consists of 1024 neurons followed 
by the sigmoid activation layer. We train this NN for 2,000 epochs with batch size 128 and 
learning rate of 1e-4 using Adam optimization algorithm. The total number of trainable 
parameters is ~17M with total training time ~3 hours. 
For the 64x64 pattern size, the best performing NN consists of one input layer with 
4096 neurons matching the input pattern size, 3 hidden layers with 4096 neurons each of 
them followed by ReLU activation layer. Since the speckle images are normalized and 
ranged between 0 and 1, the output layer consists of 4096 neurons followed by the sigmoid 
activation layer. We train this NN for 2,000 epochs with batch size 64 and learning rate of 
1e-3 using Adam optimization algorithm. The total number of trainable parameters is ~50M 
with total training time ~11 hours. 
Besides the fully connected NN architectures, other configurations based on the 
convolutional neural networks and residual networks were investigated. However, the 
results for these types of networks were equivalent to the architectures above, thus I do not 
present them here.  
Notably, increasing the input data dimension drastically increases the training time 
as well as the number of trainable parameters causing an extreme increase in computational 
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overhead in terms of required GPU memory. This fact can be clearly observed in Figure 
6.8.  
 
Figure 6.8: Training time and the complexity of NNs in terms of the number of parameters 
across the input pattern sizes. 
 
Specifically, the time required for training and the complexity of the Neural 
Networks are drastically increasing with the size of the input pattern. Therefore, for larger 
input sizes (that is the case for real experimental data), an attacker needs an access to the 
significant amount of computational resources.  
 
6.5 Conclusion 
 Our work on silicon photonic PUFs found that the resistance to ML attacks is rooted 
in the presence of optical nonlinearity in the cavity. In comparison, OSPUF’s resistance is 
rooted in the vast information content and extremely high complexity and unpredictability 
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of the scattering process for large dimensions of the data, even though the scattering 
medium is linear. 
In this chapter, I demonstrated machine learning attacks against the simplest 
simulation model of optical scattering PUF. As shown, for small dimensions of input data, 
Neural Networks are capable to reproduce the model’s behavior with high accuracy, which 
is not the case for the larger pattern sizes. In a real scenario, attacking the experimental 
OSPUF is a much more challenging process for several factors. First, volumetric scattering 
is typically observed in the experiment, thus leading to the higher unpredictability of the 
system. Second, typical sizes of speckle images detected on CCD cameras are ranged from 
128x128 to 512x512. At these dimensions, it would be extremely hard to train a Neural 
Network with such a huge set of parameters, in addition to requiring a significant amount 
of computational and time resources. Following the results from the simulation model, the 
DNN would be incapable to correctly predict the speckles given the binary patterns. 
Despite the fact, that the model presented here is simplified, the obtained results provide 











Chapter 7 : Conclusion and Future 
Directions 
 
In this dissertation, I presented the concept of Physically Unclonable Function as a 
promising alternative hardware solution to existing cryptographic primitives. Conventional 
security mechanisms are based on the idea of digital storage of secret information which is 
vulnerable to copying, stealing, and destruction. The idea of Physical One-Way Functions, 
developed by Pappu et al., allowed us to extract the benefits of using the random disordered 
media in information security [29]. Pappu’s work became a cornerstone for the next couple 
of decades of PUF research. Since then, there is a vast number of PUF implementations 
has been developed and applied as an alternative protection mechanism of the secret 
information. In Chapter 3, as one of the optical PUFs, I presented Silicon Photonic PUF, 
originally developed by Grubel et. al. [26, 67]. According to the original work, this optical 
PUF exhibits a number of advantages over the existing optical PUF systems. First, it was 
demonstrated that silicon PUF can be directly integrated onto electronic circuits and easily 
deployed with telecommunications infrastructure. Second, silicon photonic PUF is the first 
PUF that harnesses the chaotic nature of the cavity and nonlinearity of the silicon material 
that significantly increases the information content and the complexity of the output signal. 
Third, silicon PUF device exploits the ultrafast response of the cavity as one of the main 
protection mechanism from adversarial cloning or emulation process. In addition, low-cost 
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production, simplicity, and compactness make silicon photonic PUF an attractive 
technology in a range of potential authentication protocols including smart credit cards, 
mobile and desktop devices.  
As an important extension on silicon photonic PUF, in the work presented here, I 
thoroughly investigated the security of the device and robustness to adversarial attacks. 
Specifically, I examined the resistance of photonic cavity to the state-of-the-art machine 
learning techniques. After performing sets of different machine learning attacks under 
various scenarios, I demonstrated clearly that the optical nonlinearity of the silicon material 
plays a crucial role in the device’s resistance. Therefore, based on the results from [26] and 
Chapter 4,5, the true unclonability of this PUF is established.  
Then, I return to the roots of PUF devices by exploring the possibility of attacks on 
Pappu’s original Optical Scattering PUF. Surprisingly, no machine learning attacks have 
ever been reported on scattering PUFs. This motivated our group to study the underlying 
reasons for strong resistance of OSPUFs to modeling attacks. In Chapter 6, I constructed a 
simple model of single surface scattering to collect the required dataset that would be used 
in attacking procedure. I demonstrated that even at the simplest level of OSPUF 
representation, the dimension of input data plays a critical role in the resilience against ML 
attacks.  
The current results for both of optical PUFs open the new avenues for potential 
research directions. For silicon Photonic PUF, there is a plethora of ways and directions 
for continued research. Regarding the device itself, a number of future steps are mentioned 
in B. Grubel Ph.D. thesis [26] including the optimization of coupling efficiency, 
improvement of ray-tracing models, exploring other techniques for post-processing of raw 
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responses, and etc. In addition to that, I would like to add, that it would be interesting to 
implement photonic PUF based on different materials such as amorphous silicon. 
Potentially, this could enhance the security of the device and overcome the problem of high 
optical loss of the cavity (~30 dB). Another future step is to implement a set of optimization 
techniques based on the size of the cavity and the amount of nonlinearity for different 
shapes and geometric configurations. Regarding the resistance to ML attacks, it is highly 
important to track the resistance to rapidly growing ML area. It is well-known fact, that 
Deep Learning is one of the “hottest” areas of Artificial Intelligence area with novel 
approaches introduced from year to year. Therefore, it is very important to ensure the 
protection of silicon PUF from future ML models. 
Regarding the scattering PUF, I suggest constructing the advanced simulation 
models of OSPUFs. In Chapter 6, the scattering was estimated using one random phase 
mask. Hence, it would be interesting to model the volumetric scattering by introducing 
several phase masks, thus incorporating Fresnel diffraction theory for the light propagation 
between these masks. Volumetric scattering model would be a more realistic representation 
of physical scattering token. Similarly, one should investigate the resistance against 
machine learning attacks in the given case. Since the DNN emulates the simulation model 
of OSPUF at small pattern sizes, I would also suggest building the experimental setup 
where thin scattering token is illuminated by small binary patterns. Susceptibility of the 
given system to ML attacks and comparison of the results to the results from Chapter 6 
would be an interesting analysis. 
On a final note, I hope that this dissertation would be useful and interesting for 
people who found themselves in a various research area such as cryptography, information 
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